Statement by Mr. Masato TAKAOKA

Alternative Representative of Japan

to the Second Preparatory Committee

of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties

to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva, 4 May 1998

(Cluster 2) Safeguards

　

　 My delegation wishes to address some of the substantive issues under Cluster 2, which we did not cover fully in our remarks during the plenary meeting.

　

　 First, it is important for the Prep.Com. to underscore the fundamental importance of the IAEA safeguards as a means to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As one of the most advanced nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and as the country accepting the largest degree and scope of the IAEA safeguards in the world, Japan supports the Agency's activity in this area. We urge all non-nuclear weapon States which have not yet done so, to accept the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

　

　 The Prep.Com. may also wish to welcome the adoption at the special session of the Agency's Board meeting in May last year of the additional Model Protocol of the Programme "93+2." The next step should be to ensure the universal worldwide implementation of the Protocol. Japan, for its part, has commenced consultations with the Agency on this matter since March, and is fully committed to working towards early conclusion of the negotiations. I may add, on the other hand, that improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards is also a priority in order to offset medium and long-term cost increases relative to the implementation of the Protocol.

　

　 Secondly, the Prep.Com. may wish to appreciate the role played by nuclear-related export controls such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zanger Committee to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Japan has a particular commitment to the NSG as the Japanese Mission in Vienna functions as the Point of Contact to provide necessary services to facilitate the Group's activities. While we encourage non-NSG countries to adhere to the NSG Guidelines, we will continue to work hard to promote openness and transparency with non-member countries through dialogue and cooperation. (As the distinguished representative of the U.K. has mentioned in the capacity of the Chair of the Group), the NSG is committed to this end. Japan is also undertaking various outreach programs particularly with countries in Asia and the Pacific, and the former Soviet Union to promote understanding of the importance of export controls.

　

　 Thirdly, the question of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is noteworthy. While no actual cases have been detected in recent years, my delegation believes that illicit trafficking has grave implications for global security, and thus requires careful attention by the international community. It is for this reason that Japan supports and contributes to the active undertakings of the IAEA and G8 countries to combat such trafficking. Japan has assisted in the establishment of nuclear material accountancy and control systems in the Newly Independent Sates of the former Soviet Union.

　

　 Fourthly, my delegation wishes to point out the importance of improving the transparency related to plutonium and highly enriched uranium derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and of ensuring that such materials are managed and disposed of in such a way that they cannot be reused for military purposes. Japan supports the efforts of nuclear-weapon States to place such materials under IAEA verification and hopes that it will be realized as early as possible.

　

　 Lastly, but not the least, the Prep.Com. may also need to review the nuclear weapons development question in North Korea, which is a matter of serious concern, not only to the security situation in North East Asia but also to global nuclear non-proliferation. It is of crucial importance that North Korea acts properly in accordance with the 1994 U.S.A.-DPRK Agreed Framework and the Supply Arrangement concerning the Light Water Power Project. While we commend the IAEA for its efforts to monitor the freeze of specified facilities in North Korea, it is regrettable that there continues to be non-compliance in important aspects of the Safeguards Agreement between North Korea and the IAEA. The Safeguards Agreement remains in force and binding, and its compliance constitutes a fundamental responsibility of a State Party to the NPT. We call on North Korea to co-operate fully in the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement.

　

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.