Statement by H.E. Ambassador Akira Hayashi

Representative of Japan

at the Second Preparatory Committee

of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva, 30 April 1998

　

(Cluster 1) Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

　

　

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

　

　 In my speech at the plenary meeting, I stated our basic thoughts on the fissile material cut-off treaty. Now, I would like to expand on this.

　

(The Current Situation)

　

　 The current situation where the negotiations on a cut-off treaty have not started despite the consensus decision for their immediate commencement and early conclusion in the "Principles and Objectives" of 1995 is extremely regrettable. My delegation has been, however, encouraged by the statements and the positions of many delegations which strongly advocate the early start of the negotiations on a FMCT in the CD. So, it is extremely desirable that this Prep.Com. expresses its firm determination to commence FMCT negotiations based on the report submitted in 1995 by the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

　

Mr. Chairman,

　

(Significance of a FMCT)

　

　 I would like to point out that a FMCT has several significant merits :

　

1) It promotes nuclear disarmament by banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons of the nuclear weapon States.

　

2) It contributes to the rectification of the discriminatory aspect of the NPT by placing those unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the nuclear weapon States under IAEA safeguards.

　

3) It is also an effective measure in the context of nuclear non-proliferation because it caps the nuclear capability of so-called nuclear threshold states on which no restraints are now imposed.

　

Mr. Chairman,

　

(The Shannon Report)

　

　 In our view, the Shannon report and mandate contained therein which was agreed to by consensus at the CD in 1995, is the result of arduous and painstaking coordination efforts. It is unwise to try to revise it, not only because the mandate is an appropriate and realistic one, but also because attempts to revise it will cause more difficulties and delays in the commencement of FMCT negotiations.

　

Mr. Chairman,

　

(Scope of a FMCT)

　

　 The scope of a convention on a FMCT should be the ban of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as was stated in the Shannon Mandate. Naturally, the question as to what materials can be covered by a FMCT requires technical consideration in light of the norms of the IAEA. We should not impose new burdens on the non-nuclear weapon States of the NPT who have accepted the full scope of the safeguards in their peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

　

　 The problem of existing stocks of fissile materials is very important. In view of the various positions taken by the delegations, it seems, to my delegation, not possible to include the issue of existing stocks in a FMCT for the purpose of the early start of negotiations. Having said that, the problem of the existing stocks can not and should not be left aside. Increased transparency should be definitely introduced. We are aware that the initiatives among the United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA have already been taken with this in mind. In this connection, the elements contained in the Canadian Working Paper and the idea proposed by Australia to have a two staged agreement to achieve this goal interest my delegation.

　

Mr. Chairman,

　

(Verification)

　

　 We should strive to achieve a verification regime in the context of a FMCT which is efficient and effective so as to ensure the credibility and reliability of such a treaty. At the same time, we should avoid burdening the States Parties with the excessive costs of establishment and operation of such a regime. In other words, we need to consider carefully the possible financial implications.

　

　 In order to establish an efficient and effective verification regime, it is necessary to utilize the knowledge and expertise of the IAEA. When we begin negotiations on a FMCT, it is advisable that we request the involvement of the IAEA in the early stages. Since a regime of verification for a FMCT can have many similar points with the IAEA safeguards' regime, it is natural and appropriate to assume that the IAEA will play a major role in such a regime.

　

Mr. Chairman,

　

(Utility of Intermediate Measures)

　

　 Pending the commencement of the FMCT negotiations, we still need to and can make some intermediate efforts such as consideration of the technical aspects of a FMCT or discussion in various ad hoc meetings regarding a FMCT in order to create a positive atmosphere for the commencement of FMCT negotiations. A seminar, which Japan is going to host after this session of the Preparatory Committee, is one of these meetings.

　

　 As another possible intermediate measure to be considered might be a joint moratorium by the nuclear weapon States on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

　

　 Lastly, my delegation would like to stress that Japan is not in a position to accept any arrangements which give the threshold states a third category status, which is neither that of the nuclear weapon States nor that of the non-nuclear weapon States of the NPT.

　

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.