(98.04.27)林大使ＮＰＴ再検討２準備委（一般）

　 At the outset of our work at this Second Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the high post of Chairman. I am fully confident that, under your wise and able guidance, the Committee will make headway in the strengthened review process of the NPT towards the ultimate success of the 2000 Review Conference. I would like to assure you of my delegation's fullest cooperation and support in your efforts to achieve this goal.

　 This new review process started last year in New York should, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, contribute to the promotion of the full implementation of the NPT and its universality, thereby to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The outcome of the First Preparatory Committee clearly indicates that the new review process is qualitatively different from past ones. In this Second Preparatory Committee we should continue our work on the elaboration of the draft recommendations, including the procedural ones, towards the 2000 Review Conference based upon the Chairman's working paper of last year.

　 In this context, I would like to point out that, while all the documents to be agreed upon for the 2000 Review Conference don't need to be prepared at this time, we should bear in mind that we will have only twenty days available before the 2000 Conference. The emphasis, therefore, during this Prep.Com. should be on streamlining various points already contained in the Chairman's working paper as well as additional new ones possibly put forward during this meeting, rather than on enlarging the scope of discussion.

　 Japan continues to commit itself to the promotion of the universality of the NPT. With the new accessions to the Treaty since its extension, there are now 186 States Parties, if Brazil becomes a State Party, then 187 States Parties, making this Treaty the one with the broadest membership. While welcoming this, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate Japan's strong appeal to countries not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date, particularly those countries that operate certain nuclear facilities outside the safeguards of the IAEA.

　 On the other hand, I would like to stress that parallel efforts should be made to improve the security environment in their respective regions. In this respect, current situations in these regions are a source of concern.

　 A world free of nuclear weapons is the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Japan has sponsored, since 1994, UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament with a view to achieving that goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. UNGA resolution 52/38K was adopted last year by an overwhelming majority which included the five nuclear weapon States.

　 The "Principles and Objectives" of 1995 stipulates in paragraph 4 (c) "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."

　 In this context of nuclear disarmament, the START process which aims at substantially reducing the roles and risks of nuclear weapons is, at present, the most significant. Japan would like to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II as soon as possible, and calls for the START III negotiations to commence very soon. For our part, we have been committed to contributing to the promotion of the START process through our various projects to assist the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

　 On the other hand, the future perspective of nuclear disarmament is not very clear. Although a programme of action was proposed by a group of countries for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, it seems, to our delegation, unrealistic. As the "systematic and progressive efforts" should be pursued on a continuous basis, the work on identifying future steps should begin in the CD. We look forward to a positive outcome from the consultation under the auspices of the Troika on this issue in the CD.

　 The UNGA resolution 52/38K referred to earlier invites the nuclear weapon States to keep the States Members of the UN duly informed of the progress or efforts made in systematic and progressive reduction of nuclear weapons. Japan hopes that, as was the case in the First Prep.Com., these five nuclear weapon States will provide us with updated information on such efforts.

　 In this context, I would like to encourage the nuclear weapon States to share information on various practical issues which they are encountering in their current nuclear disarmament efforts. These issues include securing financial resources to dismantle nuclear weapons, managing surplus fissile material from such dismantlement, and containing proliferation risks of sensitive material and information. Through greater familiarization with these practical aspects of nuclear disarmament, the international community can deepen its mutual understanding on how to proceed with nuclear disarmament.

　 The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an important positive step in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan has already ratified the Treaty in July last year and would like to welcome, wholeheartedly, the recent ratification of this Treaty by two nuclear weapon States, namely France and the United Kingdom.

　 In order for the CTBT to enter into force as quickly as possible after the required two year period elapses, we call upon all states which have not yet done so, to ratify the CTBT as promptly as possible. In particular, I am referring to those states whose ratification is required for the CTBT's entry into force.

　 As it was pointed out in paragraph 4 (b) of the "Principles and Objectives", the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) is the most important multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda after the conclusion of CTBT. The current situation, where negotiations have not yet started in the CD on this issue, is a clear non-compliance with our decision taken in 1995. It is indeed regrettable that our work did not begin immediately after our decision to establish the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995. The period of three years we have lost is extremely important not only because we wasted it but because the credibility of the political will expressed in the decision of 1995 as well as that of the Conference on Disarmament are at stake.

　 I should say with regret that the CD has not yet agreed to start negotiations this year. More flexibility on the part of each state is truly required for the negotiations to begin. The purpose of discussion of this issue in this Committee should be to contribute to early commencement of such negotiations in the CD. So it is extremely desirable that this Prep.Com. expresses, as a whole, its firm determination to commence FMCT negotiations on the basis of the report submitted in 1995 by the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

　 Japan has been making various concrete efforts to bring about favourable conditions for the start of negotiations. For example, we proposed to create an occasion for the discussion of the technical aspects of a FMCT pending the decision to start negotiations. In this connection, it is Japan's intention to hold a seminar after this Prep.Com. to explore some of the technical problems involved in FMCT negotiations.

　 The importance of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States under the NPT regime is fully recognized. My delegation welcomes the Security Council resolution 984 (1995), as well as those declarations by nuclear weapon States with regard to the negative and the positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. Further steps should be considered according to the "Principles and Objectives."

　 As for the nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), it is the position of Japan that such zones, which are internationally recognized and established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, contribute to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and enhancement of global and regional security. With regard to the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, my delegation hopes that, taking into account relevant UN resolutions concerning a NWFZ in the Middle East, the political as well as security environments in this region can be improved for the establishment of such zone.

　 Japan welcomes the adoption in May of last year, at the special meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA, of the model protocol of "Programme 93+2" to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. It is important that as many countries as possible, including the five nuclear weapon States, conclude an additional protocol with the IAEA to implement "Programme 93+2" as early as possible so the global regime of nuclear non-proliferation can be greatly strengthened.

　 In the context of nuclear non-proliferation, Japan supports the efforts made by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee to increase the effectiveness and transparency of export control and enhance its universality. My government would like to call upon all states to comply with the guidelines stipulated in the NSG regarding export control of relevant nuclear materials by taking the necessary national legal measures.

　 Ensuring the safe uses of nuclear energy is an absolute priority. In this context, my government strongly wishes that more states become States Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Furthermore, my government welcomes the adoption at the Diplomatic Conference in September last year of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Safety of Spent Fuel Management, which was subsequently opened for signature.

　 Due to time constraints, I have not touched on some important procedural issues at this juncture. My delegation will express its views, in detail, on both these and substantive issues at a later stage, when necessary.