(97.04.08)黒河内大使ＮＰＴ１準備委

　 Let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the Chair. Having witnessed the very able manner in which you presided over the final Preparatory Committee Meeting for the NPT Review and Extension Conference, I have no doubt that you will guide the work of this Committee to a successful conclusion. I can assure you of my delegation's full cooperation.

　 At the outset of our work at this First Preparatory Committee for the year 2000 Review Conference, it is important to reaffirm that this new NPT review process will be qualitatively different from past efforts.

　 The decisions taken at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 require that the review process itself contribute to the promotion of full implementation of the Treaty and its universality and thereby to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Toward that end, substantive aspects of the preparatory work must be fully considered in addition to making procedural preparations for the Review Conference.

　 Our task, of course, is to review the implementation of the Treaty provisions, but it is also important that we bear in mind the "Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" as decided at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

　 Before commenting on the substantive matters, I would like, very briefly, to offer for the consideration of the Committee my Government's views on some of the procedural issues confronting us. My delegation will present its position on other procedural issues in due course.

--First of all, in order to ensure continuity as well as to facilitate the participation of a large number of states, we believe that New York should be the venue of all Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference. I might add that the cost of conference services is much lower in New York than in other cities, such as Geneva and Vienna.

--Second, it is the firm position of my Government that the formula for apportioning the costs of the review process should follow established precedent, with the nuclear weapon States, which have a special status under the Treaty, being responsible for 55 percent, and the non-nuclear weapon States for the rest. The past procedure for calculating the assessments should likewise be followed.

--Third, there has been some overlap in the discussion of issues by the three Committees established during the past Review Conferences, as paragraph 5 of the decision on the "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" points out. We believe that the Preparatory Committee should pay appropriate attention to this matter to lay the ground for a satisfactory solution at the Conference.

--Fourth, we should not aim at achieving a consensus document at each Preparatory Committee meeting.　To do so would be extremely difficult and much too time-consuming.　Rather, my delegation　considers that the most appropriate and productive procedure would be for the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee meeting to issue his or her own summary report, with necessary annexes. The report would be drafted under the Chairman's sole responsibility and would not be binding on any delegation. The final report, to be submitted to the Conference by the Preparatory Committee, should be prepared at the last Preparatory Committee meeting. It should include two parts, one reviewing the Treaty, and the other recommending measures for the future.

--Fifth, we should not attempt to revise the "Principles and Objectives", since it is the product of arduous negotiations pursued at the Review and Extension Conference and stands on its own. We should, instead, strive to agree on a new set of objectives, taking into account views expressed in discussions held prior to and during the Conference.

　 Now, I would like to turn to the substance of our work. At this stage, I will confine my remarks to those issues which are of particular importance to my Government.

　 Japan considers the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty to be a major step in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially as a means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary that we make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime, including verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible. My delegation strongly appeals to those States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

　 Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament. My delegation deeply regrets that negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament due to the opposition of certain states that insist on a linkage between FMCT and nuclear disarmament in general.

　 The ultimate goal in nuclear disarmament is the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan has sponsored UNGA resolutions on nuclear disarmament with a view to achieving that goal. In accordance with resolution 51/45G, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority at the United Nations General Assembly last year, each nuclear weapon State is invited to report on the efforts it has made in the area of nuclear disarmament. In so doing, these States will certainly contribute to transparency and confidence-building on this very critical issue.

　 Japan welcomes the outcome of the recent U.S.- Russia summit meeting held in Helsinki, including the commitment by both leaders to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007. We sincerely hope that this commitment will soon lead to concrete steps by both States.

　 My Government welcomes the adoption in the Drafting Committee of a model protocol on measures of the second part of the "Programme 93 plus 2" to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. We strongly hope that this model protocol will be adopted by the IAEA Special Board of Governors in May.

　 Japan supports efforts to increase the effectiveness and transparency of export control systems through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Zangger Committee. Japan encourages each State to adhere to the NSG Guidelines by implementing legally based domestic export control measures on nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.

　 My delegation welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in October 1996. Japan highly appreciates the tireless efforts made by the Group of Experts to finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. We also welcome the Group's recommendation that a Diplomatic Conference be convened with a view to adopting the Convention.

　 The importance of our task during this new Review Process cannot be overemphasized. Japan, for its part, will spare no effort to make a positive contribution to this process.