STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. AKIRA HAYASHI
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
Geneva 11th March 1999
Thank you, Mr. President,
Please allow me to express my warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the post of the President of the Conference on Disarmament. The tasks before us have important significance for the work of this year and the immediate years to follow, and I wish to assure you of my delegation’s full support and cooperation as you lead the work of the CD.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the efforts made by your predecessor, Ambassador Robert Grey of the United States of America, and also to pay tribute to Mr.Vladimir Petrovsky as well as to his Deputy, Mr. Abdel Kader Bensmail, and their staff for the efficiency in facilitating the work of the Conference. Let me warmly welcome our new colleagues who have recently joined us.
It is also my pleasure to extend a warm welcome to the representatives of the women’s international organisations who are present today and thank them for their interest in and support to the work of the CD.
Mr. President,
Today I would like to focus on three subjects, i.e. nuclear disarmament; the FMCT; and small arms. However, it shouldn't be construed that other subjects are not important to my delegation.
(Nuclear Disarmament)
Mr. President,
The turn of events since last year have undoubtedly brought back the issue of nuclear weapons to the centre stage of the world after a few years of relaxation, negligence and even a hint of complacency.
The outcome of these events is most vividly reflected in the state of health of the single most important and most universal legal embodiment of human aspiration-the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was indefinitely extended in 1995. The indefinite extension was made possible because the treaty embraced an aspiration of humankind for nuclear disarmament as clearly as it codified the commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Thus, the treaty became the cornerstone both of nuclear disarmament and of non-proliferation. The significant tenet of the treaty remains to be that it obliges the nuclear weapon States to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament as unequivocally as it obliges the non-nuclear weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons. This collective brainchild of the late 20th century needs constant tending and nurturing since the state of its health at this moment is far from being excellent.
Then how can we fulfil our responsibility of parenthood? The only way is to be attentive to all the aspects that this treaty embodies.
Last year, the disappointing results of the Second PrepCom for the year 2000 Review Conference turned out to be only a prelude to the psychological shock wave as well as the physical seismic wave that emanated from the nuclear testing in South Asia in May 1998.
It is thus urgently needed to consolidate the NPT regime. It is simply not enough to engage in rhetorical emphasis on the importance of the NPT. We have to rear it as a living being and keep breathing vigour into it. The only way to do this is to keep making conscious collective efforts for nuclear disarmament.
Clearly, the START process constitutes the central pillar of such efforts and will remain so for some time to come. The process has been conducted between the two major nuclear weapon States, but it is not entirely a bilateral business. The outcome of the process has a significant consequence and impact on the whole world. Moreover, the process surely has an aspect of fulfilling the multilateral legal obligations under the NPT.
My delegation also believes that the obligations of the three smaller nuclear weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament are not conditional upon the pace and extent of reductions on the part of the two bigger nuclear weapon States. The three are equally and without condition obliged under the NPT as the two are. As my government proposed in last year’s PrepCom of the NPT Review Conference, it is only reasonable to expect that the three smaller nuclear weapon States at least commit themselves to not increasing their existing nuclear arsenals before they are fully engaged within the framework of the five.
As I mentioned earlier, the reduction of nuclear arsenals has been and will be for some time the domain of the bilateral and possibly the plurilateral process among the nuclear weapon States. But it is inconceivable that multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament could in any way obstruct these processes.
If we look back, we can see an impressive record of achievements based on multilateral discussions and negotiations, including most recently the CTBT. If we look forward, all the States including the nuclear weapon States, are committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons and will undoubtedly have a long journey to make before reaching that goal. The FMCT negotiations are the agreed next step on a multilateral front. But it is bound to be such a long journey that there must be room for further multilateral efforts.
Having agreed on our goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is only logical to try to identify the next multilateral steps beyond the FMCT negotiations. It is regrettable that the nuclear weapon States, reluctant to any attempt at discussing nuclear disarmament, help create suspicion about the seriousness of their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Mr. President,
My government has been tabling a draft resolution on the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly since 1994. In last year's resolution, we tried to introduce new elements in order to prescribe actions that needed to be pursued for the advancement of nuclear disarmament. These included (a) “multilateral discussions on possible future steps for nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation” and (b) “further efforts by the five nuclear weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and through their negotiations." The resolution was adopted with the support of the overwhelming majority of the UN Member States, including all the nuclear weapon States.
We recognise that the CD is instrumental in responding to what the resolution stipulated. In fact, the CD has a variety of proposals related to mechanisms and mandates for such discussions. Among them, the proposals made by Canada and South Africa are in line with our thinking expressed in the resolution. The five NATO countries seem to propose to modestly start by providing a mechanism to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views within the Conference on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament. It will be a meaningful approach as the very first step toward more substantive discussions.
With regard to the Troika consultations, I consider it in principle a useful intermediate measure in the process of establishing a more formal and structured mechanism for nuclear disarmament discussions. Nevertheless, clear results of such consultations have not yet been observed despite the efforts made by the successive Presidents. In this regard, I would like to stress the necessity of strengthening those consultations by increasing the frequency of the meetings, enhancing the profile, providing more transparency, giving a clear purpose and focus to each session, and producing the regular reports.
The aim of the Troika consultations is obviously to find an eventual consensus on an appropriate mechanism for nuclear disarmament discussions. Alternatively, we may make use of the Troika consultations as an instrument for substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, with or without changes to its mandate.
As you may recall, my delegation made a proposal for a Special Coordinator in 1997. Because my delegation is more interested in commencing the work of the CD and making progress rather than placing our national flag on one of the proposals, let me just remind the floor that the proposal is still present in case it is called upon as a means to find consensus on a mechanism and a mandate for nuclear disarmament discussions in the CD.
(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty)
Mr. President,
Now, I would like to move on to the FMCT negotiations. We believe that a FMCT is significant both for nuclear disarmament and for nuclear non-proliferation. Even though a FMCT alone cannot automatically assure the reduction of nuclear arsenals, it will nevertheless contribute to nuclear disarmament in two ways. It can at least constrain the nuclear weapon States or any State from producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. In addition, the FMCT could be yet another stepping stone in our advancement toward the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.
Mr. President,
Let me briefly set out the important principles that my government attaches to the FMCT negotiations.
First of all: “universality." In order for the international community to fully appreciate the value of the treaty, it needs to be universally adhered to, including by those States that are capable of producing nuclear weapons.
Second: “non-discrimination." The treaty should not create a legal regime which introduces distinction between the nuclear weapon State Parties and the other State Parties to the FMCT in terms of the rights and obligations of the treaty as such. But, should we stop there in terms of non-discrimination? If the FMCT introduces safeguard mechanisms short of the full-scope safeguards provided for by the NPT regime, the treaty is likely to create actual differences among State Parties to the FMCT, including a difference in verification measures at a certain kind of facility, depending on whether they are situated in the States where safeguards subject to the NPT are applied and the other States. This is a difficult issue, and my delegation needs more time to propose a solution. In any case, we should face this problem within the FMCT negotiations or in a longer time-frame.
Third: “cost-effectiveness." The cost of verification under the FMCT must be commensurate to what we could realistically expect out of the entire regime of the FMCT with its limitations. In other words, we should not seek perfection without regard to its cost. In this respect, it is also important to fully utilise the accumulated knowledge and expertise of the IAEA.
Fourth: “no restriction on the peaceful use of nuclear energy." My delegation believes that the FMCT would in no way affect the peaceful use of nuclear energy and understands that this view is shared among the CD members.
Fifth: “existing stocks." This issue must be addressed either in parallel with the current FMCT negotiations or on a stage-by-stage basis.
Mr. President,
It is often said that being too ambitious in our negotiations on the FMCT will only complicate the matter and delay its conclusion. In this assertion, it was pointed out that even codifying the ban on the future production of fissile materials with focused verification measures would be a major step forward. I am not opposing this assertion entirely because there is a sobering truth in it. However, I have some doubts if it means that all the controversial issues should be out of the purview of the negotiations.
If such a “minimalist” approach is the only possible choice for the CD, I wonder why we are investing so much time and energy in the multilateral negotiations of such a treaty.
(Small Arms)
Mr. President,
Finally, I would like to briefly touch upon the issue of small arms which was raised in several statements made earlier in this session, especially by the distinguished colleagues of Canada, Norway, Austria and South Africa. On behalf of my government, I would like to pay tribute to the great interests shown by their governments on this issue.
In the field of small arms, there are numerous on-going initiatives and activities organised by international and regional organisations such as the UN, UNDP, the OAS, and the EU, many national governments including my own, and several non-governmental organisations. My government believes that in view of the enormity of the issue, the United Nations should take the lead and play the central role.
The United Nations’ panel of governmental experts, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Donowaki, submitted its report to the Secretary-General in 1997 containing the panel’s recommendations on reduction measures as well as prevention measures in order to tackle the problem of excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer of small arms. Based upon this report, the Secretary-General established a new group of governmental experts on small arms in 1998 to consider (a) the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of the report on small arms and (b) further actions recommended to be taken. The experts’ group was further given an additional mandate with the UN resolution. This additional mandate is to consider recommendations regarding an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects to be held not later than 2001.
In this regard, I would like to welcome the Swiss government for having offered Geneva to host this conference. The group of governmental experts met again two weeks ago in Geneva for its second session immediately after the very useful workshop on small arms hosted by the Swiss government. The group will probably meet again in May in Tokyo upon invitation of my government and will then finally meet in July before submitting their report to the Secretary-General. Unless the group is given a further mandate, it will thus be able to complete the task with the submission of the report this year. Thereafter, it will be up to us to decide what we will do to implement the recommendation. In that stage, the CD will be naturally one of the fora through which we could possibly try to implement the recommendations as the Distinguished Ambassadors of Canada and Austria mentioned the possibility of the Conference on Disarmament taking up the issue of small arms. My delegation shares the same thought and finds the suggestion that the CD take up a code of conduct on arms transfers a useful one to start discussions.
Mr. President,
In conclusion, I would like to stress the urgency to start substantive discussions by adopting the Program of Work for 1999. I fully understand that priorities or emphases are not identical among the CD members and there will be no magic formula to make everybody 100% happy. But we are all aware that the continuation of the present impasse will only discredit the CD as a body and equally shame each of us. I sincerely hope that this awareness be translated into some degree of flexibility for a compromise. As far as my delegation is concerned, it is ready to be flexible in order to start concrete work in this part of the Session.