STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. AKIRA HAYASHI
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
(ON A FMCT)
Geneva, 11 August 1998
Mr. President,
(Since this is the first time for me to take the floor in the formal Plenary under your Presidency, please allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Maimeskoul, on your assumption of the high post of the President of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial juncture. I would like to assure you of my delegation's fullest support and cooperation. I would also like to take this opportunity to extend our utmost appreciation to Ambassador Sungar of Turkey, the previous President of the CD, for his leadership, dedication and hard work.)
Mr. President,
Today, after 3 years of stalemate, the CD agreed through consensus to the establishment of an Ad-hoc Committee on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. As one of the major advocates of a FMCT, my government wholeheartedly welcomes this development which came about as a result of the flexibility expressed by all the members of the CD. However, without your numerous consultations and your persistent endeavors urging us towards consensus, Mr. President, the Ad-hoc Committee could not have been established. Your efforts have been indispensable and have made this positive progress possible. In this context, I would like to express my warmest gratitude to you, Mr. President.
Mr. President,
My government considers a FMCT highly meaningful in the field of nuclear disarmament, and the NPT Review and Extension Conference of 1995 subscribes to this view. Although it is obvious that a FMCT alone cannot lead to the reduction of nuclear warheads, we still believe that it will give positive effects to the enhancement and promotion of nuclear disarmament by capping the nuclear production capabilities of nuclear weapon states.
At the same time, we believe that a FMCT is invaluable in terms of nuclear non-proliferation because it will halt the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes globally, thereby greatly consolidating and strengthening the non-proliferation regime. And now, with the challenge the NPT regime is currently facing, a FMCT is all the more important.
Thus, a FMCT will serve as an indispensable intermediate step towards the achievement of our ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons by promoting both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
Mr. President,
From this point of view, I fully agree with the Presidential Statement that clearly expresses the significance of the Presidential consultations on Agenda Item I "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament." While the significance of a FMCT should be emphasized, its conclusion alone is not satisfactory for our work in the CD. Japan firmly believes that the CD should continue its efforts to identify the next appropriate multilateral step after a FMCT. I sincerely hope that these Presidential consultations will result in a concrete and constructive mechanism or measure which will enable us to move forward towards this end.
Mr. President,
The Japanese government welcomes the commencement of negotiations on a FMCT. We also recognize that this marks only the start of our work. Everyone in this room is well aware of the differing views and positions among CD Delegations on several highly crucial and basic issues that are inherent in a FMCT, one of which is the question of the scope. Though the mandate contained in the Shannon Report clearly defines an Ad-hoc Committee on a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the issue of existing stocks of fissile materials is too important to be left aside. I am sure that the competence or otherwise of the CD rests more upon how to deal with this issue successfully than upon just agreeing on establishing an Ad-hoc Committee.
In this regard, my delegation has been encouraged by the initiative taken by the US, the Russian Federation and the IAEA. My delegation welcomes and appreciates the UK's recent initiative entitled "Strategic Defense Review," particularly its declaration on the volume and types of fissile materials in its possession.
In addition to the scope, which is rather a political issue, there are numerous technical questions which should be resolved in the course of negotiations. In this connection, I would like to remind the CD members of the outcome of the Technical Seminar, held on 10 and 11 May with the participation of highly qualified experts. The summary report of the Chairman was made available as an official document (CD/1516).
Thank you, Mr. President.