(98.06.23)林大使ＮＳＡ・AHCｽﾃｰﾄﾒﾝﾄ

　 Since this is the first time for me to take the floor at the meetings of this Ad Hoc Committee, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the high post of Chairman, and would like to pledge, on behalf of my delegation, our fullest cooperation.

　 The first question concerns the scope of the mandate of this Ad Hoc Committee. It is true that past Ad Hoc Committee discussions focused on so-called Negative Security Assurances. However, the mandate of this Ad Hoc Committee does not contain the word "negative." This implies that Positive Security Assurances are not necessarily excluded from the present mandate. In its working paper CD/1502, Canada raised some fundamental questions such as who gives what to whom, in exchange for what and in what form? These fundamental questions are, in my view, applicable both to NSA and PSA. Accordingly, my delegation would not oppose taking up the issue of PSA in this Ad Hoc Committee.

　 It is too ambitious for us to begin treaty negotiations on the problem of security assurances immediately since achieving a concrete agreement this year is neither expected nor an easy task. However, I would like to suggest that we try to produce a paper at the end of our work that summarizes elements of our discussions. Since it is unlikely that we can agree on anything substantive in a few months, it would be wise for us to avoid lengthy arguments on the language of the report of this Ad Hoc Committee.

　 Although it is not necessary to address every aspect or element of NSA and PSA in detail today, I would, nevertheless, like to state Japan's basic position in a preliminary manner since many other delegations have already done so.

　 In our view, the non-nuclear weapon states that have legally renounced their nuclear options have the legitimate right to demand NSA from the nuclear weapon states. Indeed, NSA is an important issue which has been on the table since NPT negotiations began. Though my country is one of the most ardent advocates of the NPT, it is also true that one of the fundamental premises of the NPT is of a discriminatory nature. Therefore, the implementation of Article VI on nuclear disarmament and the issue of the NSA is crucial in order to rectify the discriminatory nature of the Treaty.

　 In the context of NSA, I believe that the unilateral declarations by the 5 nuclear weapon states in 1995 and Security Council Resolution 984 of the same year are significant. We should not underestimate their value nor should we neglect the importance of paragraph 8 of the "Principles and Objectives." Therefore, and in accordance with that paragraph, I support efforts to seek further steps in the context of NSA to determine whether such steps can, indeed, take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

　 PSA is an important item that warrants discussion because, it cannot be conceptually refuted that assistance should be provided to non-nuclear weapon states when that State is threatened by nuclear weapons or has fallen victim to nuclear weapons. However, as in the case of NSA or perhaps more so in the case of PSA, each element needs to be considered carefully, and it is appropriate for us to start our work by carefully reviewing the unilateral declarations of the 5 nuclear weapon states and Security Council Resolution 984 in order to gain a clear understanding of what is necessary.

　 Since PSA encompasses legal, military, humanitarian, financial and other aspects, the concept of PSA is difficult to define. There is not a simple answer. We should carefully consider the possibility of further measures in addition to the existing declarations of the nuclear weapon states and Security Council Resolution 984.

　 As I have already stated, Security Assurances can help to offset the discriminatory nature of the NPT and it is the legitimate right of the non-nuclear weapon states that have legally renounced their nuclear options to demand such assurances. Therefore, Security Assurances are not only necessary for enhancing the actual security of non-nuclear weapon states, but also relevant to the maintenance and consolidation of the non-proliferation regime.