STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. AKIRA HAYASHI
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
(ON THE CUT-OFF SEMINAR CONFERENCE)
Geneva, 28 May 1998
Thank you, Mr. President.
At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the high post of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Your wisdom and experience will, undoubtedly, prove beneficial to us all and it is fortunate that we can rely on your able leadership at this most challenging time. I can assure you of the fullest co-operation of my delegation and would like to take a moment to express my appreciation to Ambassador Al-Hussami of the Syrian Arab Republic, the previous President of the CD, for his dedication and hard work.
Mr. President,
I have asked for the floor to report to the Conference on Disarmament on the "Seminar Conference on the Technical Issues for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty" which was held on 11th and 12th May at the Palais des Nations under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
During the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the parties to the NPT, the Prep.Com. heard resounding remarks across the board supporting the early commencement of FMCT negotiations.
Our work in the second part of this year's session of the CD has started and this, I believe, provides us with a new opportunity to make constructive progress. Judging from the promising comments of many delegations during the second NPT Prep.Com, many of us seem to agree that the CD should take an unambiguous and determined step towards making a FMCT a reality. While we are aware of the concerns of certain countries that wish to place preconditions on the start of FMCT negotiations, aren't the three years of doldrums sufficient for us to realize that absolutely no progress will be made unless we agree to begin?
Having considered the well known difficulties in commencing FMCT negotiations right away, and having been convinced that we could make some intermediate efforts in order to create a positive atmosphere for the start of negotiations and with a view to start concentrating on a FMCT, Japan hosted the aforementioned Seminar Conference of an ad hoc nature outside the CD, but close to the CD conference room during the first 2 days of the second part of the CD's 1998 session.
The purpose of the Seminar Conference was to focus on the technical, rather than the political aspects of a FMCT and such issues as how to start negotiations were not considered. This approach was based on the understanding that, since a FMCT involves various technical issues, attempts to engage in technical discussions could contribute to paving the way to actual negotiations.
Mr. President,
I would now like to speak about the Seminar Conference in more detail.
Governmental experts in charge of nuclear issues from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America participated in their personal capacities. Experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) also attended, as did a number of leading non governmental experts. Many delegates to the Conference on Disarmament were also involved in discussions, and my delegation was grateful to their participation as well as to generous logistic support provided by the CD Secretariat. In this respect, Mr. Bensmail's help was invaluable. Mr. Hiroyoshi Kurihara, Senior Executive Director of the Nuclear Material Control Center of Japan, chaired the conference.
One and a half days of informal but intensive discussions served as a valuable opportunity for all participants to have a frank, in-depth exchange of views on the important question of how to address the various technical issues concerning a FMCT. It is hoped that these discussions will be conducive to further promoting our groundwork for the commencement of FMCT negotiations.
Mr. President,
I would like to touch on some of the salient points of the Chairman's Summary of the Seminar Conference and, I hope, we will be able to learn from the experts' discussions. This summary is the Chairman's personal statement and without prejudice to the views of any expert or CD delegation that participated in the Seminar.
The first session of the Seminar began with discussions regarding the coverage of a FMCT in terms of the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein. Participants were of the opinion that all plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) should be subject to a strict verification mechanism under the terms of the treaty. The questions surrounding Uranium 233 were also discussed.
In addition to fissile materials not directly usable for nuclear weapons such as low enriched uranium (LEU) and spent fuels, the problem of existing stockpiles was also addressed.
Concerning the issue of verification, many participants felt that both the diversion of fissile material and any undeclared enrichment or reprocessing should be detected through routine-type inspections that would correspond roughly to the current comprehensive safeguards measures of the IAEA. But it was felt that if the level of assurance provided through routine-type inspections was limited, challenge-type inspections could prove useful. Complementary measures similar to the Additional Protocol of the "93+2" Programme were also thought to be important considerations.
Participants considered several verification alternatives. Consideration was given to the kind of facilities to be covered, their corresponding verification measures and the trade-off between the expected level of assurance and the cost of each alternative. In addition, the applicability of the existing IAEA safeguards mechanism to a FMCT was thought to warrant further careful consideration.
With regard to nuclear weapon States as well as those States not party to the NPT, many participants stressed the need of developing national systems such as the state's systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) and/or a physical protection system.
Participants further considered both problems resulting from facilities located in nuclear weapon States that were not designed to be placed under safeguards and difficulties in states where the military and civilian fuel cycles are not entirely separated. In this context, it was suggested that prevention of leakage of information with proliferation risks would be an important issue for consideration.
It was felt that the issue of termination of verification under a FMCT needed to be further addressed.
Many participants saw the IAEA as the most suitable body to carry out verification tasks under a FMCT. However, they were cautioned that, because a FMCT would lead to an expansion of verification activities, due consideration should be given to the new infrastructure that these activities would surely require.
Issues of ensuring transparency and irreversibility were also addressed in the Seminar. Though these elements may fall outside of the scope of a FMCT, many participants felt that they were extremely important and deserved consideration.
One of the experts noted that transparency is an essential component of irreversibility, and that, to ensure irreversibility, it would be desirable to take several steps in parallel with a FMCT, the first of which being the declaration and proper management of military direct-use material withdrawn from dismantled weapons and such material considered surplus and designated for transfer into the civilian use. However, some warned that such efforts would be more successful were they pursued independently from a FMCT, rather than addressed by the treaty itself. Finally, a participant stressed that the leap from secrecy to transparency is a political decision.
Many participants expressed their interest in an Australian proposal made at the Second Prep.Com. of the NPT 2000 Review Conference concerning a phased approach with a FMCT being the core and first step.
Mr. President,
Attached to the text of this speech are three documents, one of which is the complete version of the Chairman's Summary of the Seminar Conference. Also attached is a list of participants as well as the schedule of the conference. I would like to request that the Secretariat issue these papers as an official document and hope they will prove useful and encouraging, motivating us to begin FMCT negotiations as soon as possible.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Chairman's Summary
Seminar Conference on Technical Issues for
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
11 and 12 May 1998
Geneva
1. INTRODUCTION
The "Seminar Conference on Technical Issues concerning a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty" was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, from 11 to 12 May 1998 under the sponsorship of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Governmental experts in charge of nuclear issues from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America took part in the Seminar in their private capacities. Also, experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) attended the seminar, as did a number of leading nongovernmental experts. Many delegates to the Conference on Disarmament also took part in discussions. Generous logistic assistance was provided by the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament for the seminar. My gratitude is extended to all those individuals and organizations.
It is difficult to summarize the content of all the discussions held over the past one and a half days while still doing justice to all the points made by the participants. Therefore, the following is an account of only the salient points and the main thrusts of the discussions that took place, as seen by myself as the chairman of the seminar. While I will do my utmost to be as objective and fair as possible, it is with the awareness that my account may not be to the complete satisfaction of the participants, and it is with their abundant indulgence that I make the following summary of the conference.
One and a half days of informal but intensive meetings served as a valuable opportunity for all the participants to have a frank and in-depth exchange of views on the important question of how to address various technical issues concerning a FMCT.
Of course the Seminar was primarily intended for deepening understanding among those with diverse views, and not for the adoption of any agreed documents or statements. I am pleased to state that all the participants felt the last one and a half days of discussions were useful and rewarding in terms of deepening their understanding of important technical issues and in gauging the practicability of various ideas concerning a FMCT. It is hoped that the discussions in the Seminar will be conducive to further promoting our groundwork for the commencement of FMCT negotiations.
2. TECHNICAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE COVERAGE OF FMCT
The seminar opened with an excellent presentation concerning various significance of a FMCT with regard to arms control and disarmament.
The issue of possible coverage of a FMCT was discussed in the first session with particular attention to the terms of the Shannon Report.
Participants were of the opinion that a FMCT should prohibit the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and therefore that all plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU) must be placed under strict verification mechanism of this treaty. It was also pointed out that Uranium-233 should be treated similarly.
Participants also discussed how to deal with the issue of HEU used for naval propulsion purposes in the context of a FMCT. Some stressed that such HEU should be placed under appropriate material control and accounting. It was recognized that technical aspects of this issue merits further consideration.
The issue of fissile materials not directly usable for nuclear weapons such as low enriched uranium (LEU) and spent fuels were also discussed. While many emphasized the need to address these materials for greater assurance against diversion, it was cautioned that careful consideration is necessary in terms of financial implication.
It was the view of many participants that tritium should be out of the coverage of a FMCT.
Some participants raised the issue of existing stockpiles. In this connection, several variations of a potential scope of a FMCT was presented. Some others were of the opinion that the scope of the treaty should be limited to the future production. A phased approach for greater transparency and irreversibility was also considered.
3. VERIFICATION MECHANISM UNDER FMCT
The issue of verification was considered in a part of the first session and in the entire second session.
A participant from nuclear weapon State stated that they are in the process of considering relevant issues taking into consideration both technical aspects and usefulness of specific measures. It was suggested by another participant that nuclear weapon States could share with non nuclear weapon States information on their relevant experience and technical problems they face.
In principle, participants shared the opinion that the purpose of the verification regime under a FMCT should be detecting both the diversion of fissile material and any undeclared enrichment or reprocessing. The issue of importation of relevant materials were also raised.
Concerning possible structure of a verification mechanism under the treaty, many participants were of the opinion that it would include routine-type inspections that would correspond roughly to the current comprehensive safeguards measures of the IAEA. It was also a shared view that some sort of challenge inspections are worth consideration. It was recognized during the discussions that if the level of assurance ensured through routine-type inspections was limited, the challenge inspections would play an important role. In addition, it was pointed out that some complementary measures along the lines of the Additional Protocol should be considered.
Also discussed was whether a legal instrument for the verification mechanism would take the form of verification agreements / arrangements like the case in the NPT.
Participants considered several verification alternatives that could be adopted under the treaty. Sets of facilities to be covered and corresponding verification measures, as well as each alternative's trade-off between the expected level of assurances and necessary costs were presented.
It was a shared view among the participants that the applicability of existing IAEA safeguards mechanism to a FMCT should be considered carefully. Difference may arise between these two because of objectives and obligations of a FMCT that is qualitatively different from those of the NPT, and also because of technical development in the field of verification measures. Therefore under a FMCT, important technical parameters such as "significant quantities" and "timeliness goal" may be different from those of existing IAEA safeguards system.
Many participants stressed the need of developing national systems such as a state's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) and / or a physical protection system in nuclear weapon State as well as non parties to the NPT. Adequate information to be declared by States should also be considered.
Participants pointed out the need to consider problems arising from facilities in nuclear weapon States that are not designed to be placed under safeguards. Problems also arise from those states where military and civilian fuel cycle are not entirely separated. These problems will pose technical challenges, and in this context, it was suggested that prevention of leakage of information with proliferation risk would be an important issue for consideration.
The issue of termination of verification under a FMCT need to be further addressed, if the coverage of verification mechanism under the Treaty is similar to comprehensive safeguards system.
Many participants regarded the IAEA as the most suitable body to carry out verification tasks under a FMCT. Caution was expressed in this context that, as a FMCT would certainly entail a significant expansion of verification-related activities, due consideration is necessary with a view to acquiring additional infrastructure including competent human resources for inspection.
It was made clear that the Agency remains ready to help in the process of further discussions and negotiations in whatever way considered appropriate and relevant by States. It was the view shared by all participants that each of these verification issues merit further in-depth discussions.
4. ENSURING TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY
In the third and last session, issues of ensuring transparency and irreversibility was addressed. While issues there may be out of the scope of a FMCT, ensuring transparency and irreversibility were viewed by many participants as an extremely important element for consideration.
It was pointed out by a presenter that transparency is an essential component of irreversibility, and that, to ensure irreversibility, it would be desirable to take several steps.
It was also pointed out that stockpiles may contain sensitive information in relation to nuclear non-proliferation. It was suggested that useful experience could be learned from EURATOM as well as from South Africa in this respect. It was also noted that, as a first step, military direct-use material withdrawn from dismantled weapons and such material considered excess and designated for transfer into the civilian use, should be declared and properly managed in parallel with a FMCT. Caution was expressed, however, that such efforts would be more successful were they pursued independently with a FMCT, rather than addressed by the treaty itself. A participant stressed that a leap from secrecy to transparency is a political decision.
Many participants expressed their interest in an Australian proposal concerning a phased approach with a FMCT being the core and the first step of it.
SEMINAR CONFERENCE ON TECHNICAL ISSUES
FOR A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY
1. DATE
Monday, 11 May and Tuesday, 12 May
2. VENUE
Room H3, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland
3. PURPOSE
Through seminar-style deliberations focusing on technical aspects of a fissile material cut-off treaty, this conference aims at providing a basis for future negotiations of the treaty. In order to focus on technical aspects of the treaty, this conference does not discuss political issues related to the commencement of the treaty.
4. CHAIRMAN
Mr. Hiroyoshi KURIHARA
Senior Executive Director, Nuclear Material Control Center,
Tokyo, Japan
5. PARTICIPANTS
(1) Governmental experts from countries concerned, one expert from IAEA and several non-governmental experts
(2) Members of CD delegations
Schedule
11 May (Monday)
10:00 Opening
・ introductory remarks by Ambassador Akira HAYASHI
・ keynote remarks by Professor George BUNN
10:30 coffee break
10:50-13:00 SESSION I: Fissile materials for nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices
- What does "Shannon Mandate" mean in technical terms?
(What is to be prohibited and what is to be placed under safeguard?)
-plutonium
-HEU
-LEU
-spent fuels
-naval fuels
-other issues
・ Presentation by
-- Mr. Warren STERN, Senior Technical Adviser, Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division, ACDA, U.S.A.
-- Dr. Annette SCHAPER, Senior Research Associate, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt
・ General discussion among experts
・ Questions and answers with CD delegates
14:30 SESSION 2: Verification
-objective
-structure
-facilities to be covered
-facilities that are not designed to be subject to
safeguards from the beginning
-preventing leakage of information with
proliferation risk
-other specific issues
・ Presentation by
-- Mr. Demetrius PERRICOS, Director, Division of Operations (A), Department of Safeguards, IAEA
-- Mr. Kinji KOYAMA, Senior Fellow, Center for the Promotion and Non-proliferation, Japan
・ General discussion among experts
・ Questions and answers with CD delegates
16:15 Coffee break
16:30-18:00 SESSION 2 continued
12 MAY (Tuesday)
10:30 SESSION 3: Ensuring transparency and irreversibility
-measures for enhancing transparency
-measures for ensuring irreversibility
-approach to move ahead
・ Presentation by -- Ms. Rebecca JOHNSON, Acronym Institute
・ General discussion among experts
・ Questions and answers with CD delegates
12:00 coffee break
12:30 Summary by the Chairman
Closing
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
l. Chairman
Mr. Hiroyoshi KURIHARA, Senior Executive Director, Nuclear Material Control Center, Japan
2. Keynote Speaker and Presenters
Prof. George BUNN, Professor, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University
Ms. Rebecca JOHNSON, Acronym Institute
Mr. Kinji KOYAMA, Senior Fellow, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan
Mr. Demetrius PERRICOS, Director, Division of Operation (A), Department of Safeguards, IAEA
Dr. Annette SCHAPER, Senior Research Associate, Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, Germany
Mr. Warren STERN, Senior Technical Adviser, Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division, ACDA, U.S.A.
3. Other Participants (Governmental experts and NGO representatives)
Mr. Jaime ACUNA, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Chile to the CD
Mr. Graham ANDREW, Department of Trade and Industry, U.K.
Dr. K. BALU, Head of Nuclear Waste Management Group, Department of Atomic Energy, India
Mr. John CARLSON, Director, Safeguard Office, Australia
Mr. Emmanuel COCHER, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
Mr. Amnon EFRAT, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Israel to the CD
Mr. Ibrahim Aly Saleh El-SHAHAWI, Chief of Nuclear Fuel Department, Nuclear Plant Authority, Ministry of Electricity and Energy, Egypt
Mr. Andreas FRIEDRICH, Chief of Section, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland
Mr. Mark GLAUSER, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Canada to the CD
Dr. Peter HOWARTH, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Section, Nuclear Policy Branch, Australia
Dr. Max KELLER, Chief of Section, Atomic, Biological and Chemical Laboratory, Spiez, Switzerland
Mr. Bruno LE MAIRE, Non-Proliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
Dr. Patricia M. LEWIS, Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Mr. Andre MERNIER, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Belgium to the CD
Dr. Tariq RAUF, Director, International Organizations and Non-Proliferation Project at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Mr. Michel RICHARD, Deputy-Director, International Relations Direction, Atomic Energy Commission, France
Mr. Navtej SARNA, Counsellor, Embassy of India in Tehran
Mr. Beat WIELAND, Chief of Section, Federal Office of Energy, Switzerland
Dr. Nick von WIELLIGH, Senior Manager of Nuclear Non-Proliferation of the Atomic Energy Cooperation, South Africa