Statement in support of appointing a Special Coordinator on Nuclear Disarmament
February 11 1997
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@ I would like to state my views on the issue of nuclear disarmament. It seems that there are three different views among members of the CD on this issue. The first view is to set a time-bound framework to achieve the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The second view is that the issue of nuclear disarmament is the exclusive domain of NWS. The third view, I believe, takes the middle ground between these two positions.
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@ With regard to the first view, Japan fully shares the objective of seeking the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is Japan's sincere desire to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons that motivated us to take the initiative at the UNGA, for three consecutive years, for the adoption of a resolution on subject of nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
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@ However, Japan does not share the view that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved by setting a time-bound framework. It is obvious that under the present circumstances, the elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved in the near future. Neither can it be achieved by setting a long-term framework delineated by decade. The bottom line is that the success of any disarmament negotiations, in particular, that of nuclear disarmament, depends largely on the international situation and security environment at the time. Under the rapidly changing current environment, no one can foresee for certain the international circumstances in the distant future, and thus it is simply unrealistic to promote nuclear disarmament by setting a long-term time frame on the elimination of those weapons.
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@ I would like to clarify that we are not at all opposed to the idea of setting target dates for negotiations. A target date can be a useful tool, as long as the period in question is realistic and the situation is adequately matured, for example, one in which there is a general agreement on the objective of the negotiations. One should recall that target dates were set on the completion of negotiations of both the CTBT and the amendment of a protocol of the CCW. If we set a realistic target date on negotiations at the time when the security environment takes a favorable turn and the possibility of conclusion of negotiations emerges, it will facilitate the successful conclusion. However, setting a time-bound framework in itself does not help to improve the security environment nor the progress in nuclear disarmament.
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@ Regarding the second view, i.e., that nuclear disarmament should be negotiated exclusively by the nuclear weapon states, there are points on which we agree and those which we cannot support. Firstly, if nuclear weapon states are claiming that nuclear disarmament such as the actual reduction of existing nuclear warheads should be negotiated between nuclear weapon states and, thus, is not an appropriate item to be negotiated in the CD, Japan does agree. It is a persuasive argument that non-nuclear weapon states, including Japan, have no place in negotiations because they have no nuclear weapons to eliminate. I would like to point out here, however, that non-nuclear weapon states play a meaningful@role through financial means in the implementation of actual reduction. For example, Japan has contributed one hundred million US dollars in support of the dismantling of nuclear warheads in Russia.
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@ On the other hand, if the nuclear weapon states are asserting that nuclear disarmament should be negotiated exclusively by the nuclear weapon states alone, Japan does not subscribe to this view. As I stated at the CD Plenary on January 30, because of their devastating destructive power and their inhumane effects, nuclear weapons are a major concern of international community as a whole, and therefore a major concern in the CD.
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@ I do not intend to engage in an academic debate here, but I think there has been some differences in the interpretation of the term "nuclear disarmament". Some have used it to mean nuclear disarmament in a very limited sense, i.e. only nuclear disarmament such as the reduction and elimination of nuclear warheads, others use the term in a broader sense to mean a wide range of nuclear disarmament measures including the CTBT and an FMCT. Judging from the past agenda and record of negotiations, it is clear to me that the CD has a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the broad sense of the term.
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@ I believe that the view of Japan has been clarified to some extent through what I have said, but I would like to summarize our views as follows:
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l. While the CD does not necessarily take up every aspect of nuclear disarmament, it is clear that there exist appropriate issues in the field of nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in the CD.
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2. Presently, while the FMCT has been identified as the next nuclear disarmament item to be negotiated in the CD, it is the only item in nuclear disarmament which has been identified for CD negotiations. The basic lines of thoughts for dealing with nuclear disarmament have continued to be divergent.
3, Under such circumstances, it is the natural course of action that the CD identify the issues for future negotiation/s. This includes the possibility of preparatory discussions on such negotiations, even though they might not be formal negotiations in@a strict sense of the word.
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In light of all of this, Japan proposes :
the Conference on Disarmament appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations with its members to identify the issue/s in the field of nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and to report to the Conference on the result of these consultations before the conclusion of the 1997 session.