(96.06.13)黒河内大使ＣＤ（中国核実験、ＣＴＢＴ）

　 The prohibition of nuclear testing is one of the most important tasks in the international efforts for nuclear disarmament. Only last December, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, with the support of numerous countries, its resolution calling for the immediate cessation of nuclear testing. And now, here in Geneva, we are tenaciously working towards the timely conclusion of the CTBT.

　 Nuclear weapon states, which enjoy special status under the NPT, bear a heavy responsibility for nuclear disarmament. They have an obligation to respond to the confidence entrusted to them by non-nuclear weapon states by moving forward nuclear disarmament.

　 China's nuclear testing runs entirely counter to the international efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Japan strongly urges China not to repeat its nuclear testing any further and calls upon China to take a more flexible attitude to enable an early conclusion of the CTBT negotiations. China's nuclear testing this time, ironically, highlights the significance and the necessity for us to have a CTBT as soon as possible. The Conference on Disarmament must meet the expectation of the international community by concluding the negotiations on the CTBT in the coming two weeks.

　 We have only two weeks to meet our deadline, but we still have many issues which remain unsolved. Some of these are issues which can be solved without much difficulty. However, there are other issues on which delegations have shown no flexibility. The only way out is to make determined efforts to work jointly towards the convergence of positions. We can not just throw out all that we have achieved so far. I strongly hope that our negotiations will be more productive in the remaining two weeks so that, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ramaker, we can reach the final compromise package. My delegation reassures the Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee of our fullest cooperation and also would like to reiterate our appreciation to the Chairman's efforts in producing the draft treaty text WP.330. We regard it as a tremendous contribution that will facilitate our negotiations during this final stage.

　 In this connection, concerning the basic obligation of the treaty, I would like to appeal to all delegations to agree to the text contained in the WP.330. I am aware that some delegations would like to have more in this provision, but it seems that this formulation is the only possible "consensus potential." In order to make this potential a reality, reasonable flexibility is needed regarding the Preamble.

　 With regard to the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, Japan's position has remained unchanged : PNEs should not be allowed under the CTBT. This position is, I would say, almost consensus in the CD. Last week the distinguished Ambassador of China announced China's decision to change its past rigid position. We regard this move as an expression of China's positive attitude toward the conclusion of the negotiations. Japan continues to urge China to accept the language contained in the WP.330 without any conditions.

　 As I said before, Japan welcomes and appreciates the Chairman's effort in providing the WP.330 and considers its content to be a fair, balanced "consensus potential." We have, however, a serious concern regarding one article. That is the Entry Into Force provision of the treaty.

　 Japan has been emphasizing not only the importance of the conclusion of the negotiations but also the necessity of early and effective implementation of the treaty. The CTBT must not be only a piece of paper. Once it is concluded, it must become effective as an international law at the earliest date possible.

　　It is Japan's serious concern that the Entry Into Force formula presented in the WP.330 is open to too much risk that the future CTBT might not come into effect for decades. We understand the argument that a CTBT which requires the ratification of "key countries" as a condition for entry into force, would pressure those countries to ratify the treaty. We consider, however, that the CTBT must be a treaty credible for the international community. If the CTBT had a formula that makes its entry into force unrealistic for a considerable length of time, the international community would question whether such a treaty will ever enter into force.

　 Many proposals for Entry Into Force are being discussed, but after considering these proposals, Japan believes that the Entry Into Force formula stipulating that the treaty enters into force with the ratification of "forty countries including the five nuclear weapons States under the NPT" deserves a fresh look.

　 We have come to the conclusion that it is quite important to put a legally binding ban of nuclear testing on those five states because they are the countries that are legally given a special status, though not eternally in our view, to posses nuclear weapons under the NPT. Of course, we are not enthusiastic about giving them the power to hold the treaty hostage, but we believe that they would not be allowed to do so in the international political arena. Therefore, as far as the treaty provision is concerned, the "forty including the five nuclear weapons States" formula serves as a reasonable balance.

　 We are aware that some delegations insist that three additional countries be included in the "key countries" required as a prerequisite of the Entry Into Force of the treaty. Japan is of the view that this condition will take away the credibility that the CTBT will enter into force. If we put too many rigorous requirements into the Entry Into Force provision, the entry into force of the treaty itself will become practically impossible.

　 On the issue of OSI, we are fully aware that the negotiations require a series of difficult political decisions for each and every delegation and its capital. However, if each delegation continues to stick obstinately to its own positions, we will never succeed in finding an agreed text. Therefore, at this critical stage of negotiations, it is gravely important for delegations to search for the least unacceptable solutions and to negotiate to find a common formula. In this regard, we are encouraged by the useful exchange of views which took place at the Moderator's meeting yesterday, and my delegation hopes that this could lead to a possible breakthrough.