STATEMENT BY H.E. MRS. HISAMI KUROKOCHI
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
Geneva, 6 July 1995
 
 
Mr. President,
 
  At the outset, I wish to express my heartfelt respect to H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is here with us today at this conference. The S.G. has been making tremendous efforts to ensure international peace and security, with his strong personal awareness of the importance of the issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. Japan, which spares no effort to cooperate with the Secretary-General, earnestly hopes that substantial progress will be made in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation that are assuming more complicated aspects in the post-cold war era.
 
Mr. President,
 
  The most important task of the Conference on Disarmament today is to expedite negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In this connection, let me stress once again that Japan regards as extremely regrettable the nuclear test conducted by China and the French decision to resume nuclear testing. We urge all nuclear weapon states to respect the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, and to refrain from conducting any nuclear test, so as not to betray the confidence placed on them by non-nuclear states.
 
  During this second session of the conference, strenuous efforts have been made among delegations to grapple with many important issues in CTBT negotiations. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that many of major issues have remained unsolved. My delegation regrets to say that the progress of the negotiations in this session is not quite satisfactory.
 
  The completion of the negotiations on a CTBT in 1996 is one of the most important undertakings of the international community specified in the "Principles and Objectives". Nuclear weapon states as well as non-nuclear weapon states bear the responsibility to achieve this goal.
 
  In fact, there is not much time left for us to conclude the negotiations and draw up the final text of the treaty, if states are to sign the treaty in 1996, hopefully, in autumn of that year at the latest.
 
  After the cold war came to an end, significant steps were taken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation such as signing of START II and decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. It is extremely regrettable if we are unable to produce sufficient results on a CTBT in this year which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. I feel it may help expedite the pace of negotiations, if the negotiating states come to share the same understanding on a certain interim timetable for reaching agreement on a number of major issues so as to conclude negotiations in good time.
 
  It is essential in the next session of the CD that each state makes its utmost efforts to overcome the difference of positions on fundamental issues such as verification, organization, and scope. My delegation intends to make its stands more specific, in the hope of making contributions to facilitate negotiations. Today being the last plenary meeting of the second session, I wish to touch upon some focal points briefly.
 
  First, the issue of verification is an essential element of a CTBT. The reliability of a CTBT largely depends on the credibility of its verification system. Establishing a technically reliable and efficient verification mechanism is not an easy task. We should accelerate the treaty negotiations in order to meet the target date in view of the many points still remaining undefined.
 
  Considerable efforts have already been made by delegations on this issue. But I would like to reemphasize the importance of the participating governments and decision makers in the negotiations to take leadership and indicate a definite direction, so that detailed work may be accelerated on the clear understanding of the common ground.
 
  Concerning an International Monitoring System, a number of issues should be further examined to establish it and make it operational. In particular, it is necessary to decide immediately the required capability as well as its funding.
 
  As to On-Site Inspection, a decision has to be made whether OSI should be conducted in one phase or two phases. Such issues as decision making system for OSI implementation and its funding also need to be resolved.
 
  Secondly, CTBT Organization should be established under the principle that it is small in size, efficient, and cost-effective as much as possible, keeping the financial burden of each state party to a minimum and avoiding too much bureaucratization. Bearing in mind that it is a practical and appropriate option to pursue an arrangement by which we can avoid duplication with the activity of existing international organizations and make the best use of the expertise already possessed by those institutions, particularly the IAEA, Japan is now considering Vienna favorably as a possible seat for the organization.
 
  Moreover, the scope of this treaty is a central issue in the negotiation. For a conclusion of negotiations in 1996, utmost efforts to reach an agreement should be made during the third session of the CD. Japan, too, is determined to make its best possible contribution to this end.
 
  A CTBT should embody a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban, not a threshold test ban. Any nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion should be banned. It is not acceptable to allow any nuclear explosion, even if it is limited for the peaceful purpose only, as is alleged by one state. In this connection, it is worthy to note that the United Kingdom and France showed their flexibility in the last session of the Conference in relation to the so-called exceptional nuclear tests.
 
Mr. President,
 
  I should like to stress that the time has already come for each state to show a strong political will to solve all remaining major issues, so that we may fulfil the task entrusted to the CD by the international community, namely the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996.
 
  Japan earnestly hopes that the day will come soon when a CTBT is agreed universally and when we live in a world where the mankind shall never experience another nuclear explosion forever. To this end, Japan will continue its endeavours together with all states concerned.
 
Thank you.