(94.03.17)田中大使ＣＤ（ＣＴＢＴ）

　 On February 3, in the plenary meeting of the CD, I already introduced our preliminary views on some of the basic elements of the treaty. Since then, two working groups have duly been established and we have entered the phase of serious negotiations on a CTBT by engaging ourselves in discussions and debates on substantive matters. Therefore, my delegation finds it opportune if we can further elaborate our views on a CTBT in the light of what has already been made clear and would be debated in the near future.

　 Before going to my today's subject, I would like to welcome the decision made by the United States of America to extend the nuclear test moratorium through September 1995 which was announced on March 15, by the White House. A right decision was made at a right moment. It will certainly serve favourably to the negotiations on CTBT in the CD.

　 The CTBT we are negotiating on should be universal, and internationally and effectively verifiable. It should also be non-discriminatory, and the adherence not only of the nuclear weapon states but also of nuclear threshold countries would be crucial to the CTBT.

　 In order to successfully accomplish the negotiations in a prompt way, it would be advisable to take fully into account the CWC, PTBT and other existing treaties and make articles as clear and succinct as possible.

　 The CTBT should establish a truly reliable and a cost-effective verification regime which can systematically benefit from the utilization of already existing facilities and national verification systems as much as possible.

　 In conducting our negotiations, we should not lose sight of the fact that there is a considerable knowledge gap between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states and that both nuclear explosion technologies including those for evasion and verification technologies are of incessantly evolutionary nature.

　 It is not appropriate to set artificial deadlines but we consider it desirable to be able to reach a stage, by Spring 1995, where we can have a prospect of a successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations at hand.

　 First, I would like to make it clear that the purpose of the treaty is twofold : nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. We cannot accept a choice of either of them. Both form the ultimate goal of the treaty.

　 Second, the scope of the treaty should be total prohibition of any nuclear explosion in any environment without any exception.

　 With regards to its preparation, the word "prevent" means, in our view, that the State Party should ensure the prohibition of the preparation of any nuclear explosions by natural or legal persons, so we can dissipate our concern over the preparation for an imminent test by using the word "prevent", as in the case of PTBT. It will also be possible to set a clause, according to which consultation or clarification can be sought by any state party in case a doubtful situation emerges.

　 Third, a definition clause is not necessary. We are of opinion that by today the concept of a nuclear explosion has been more or less established. Discussion on definition may only lead our negotiations into an endless circuit.

　 On the other hand, it should be made clear that any state party should not be hampered from developing research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which are not designed to be released in an uncontrolled way.

　 Concerning the obligations imposed on states parties to prohibit natural or legal persons' activities of certain categories, the CTBT should take the approach of enumerating each activity of natural or legal persons to be prohibited. Otherwise, the contents of prohibition regarding natural or legal persons will become less clear and the states parties will have difficulty in setting those obligations in the form of national legislation.

　 Fifth, as for compliance and settlement of disputes, we can follow the examples set forth in articles 9, 12 and 14 of the CWC and establish relevant articles on clarification, consultation, procedures of the settlement of disputes, and the involvement of the UN Security Council.

　 Sixth, on verification. Whether the forthcoming CTBT will be a worthy one or not, it all depends on the verification system.

　 Verification of a nuclear explosion is a relatively easy task but at the same time no single verification means is perfect to detect all those explosions.

　 Yet, we can anticipate a steady technological progress in the field of verification so that in the future more exhaustive types of verification system can be introduced. Therefore, a realistic verification system can be envisaged in a form of a package of different verification means with a possible introduction, in the future, of more advanced and efficient means.

　 Seismological verification network forms the core of the verification system. The pressing question is how to transform GSETT-III experiment to the reliable verification system of the CTBT, as well as to ensure the successful implementation of GSETT-III as is originally planned.

　 In considering the monitoring of radionuclide, existing monitoring system implemented by IAEA, WHO, UNEP and others, as well as radionuclide monitoring conducted by many countries should be first evaluated fully.

　 With regard to on-site inspection, only a kind of challenge inspection, the naming of which may necessitate further consideration, should be considered. This inspection will be triggered off when a member state party suspects a possible nuclear explosion and its request for on site inspection is approved by the organization. The training of inspectors will be conducted by states parties either independently or within a frame-work of bilateral cooperation and the organization will keep lists of inspectors presented by each state party. At the same time, the possibility of using IAEA inspectors may be addressed.

　 For the sake of economy on verification system and also of the need to keep the military classified information, it would be wise to make as much use as possible of national technical means, including hydroacoustic means, satellites and others.

　 Seventh, the organization will be composed of a conference of states parties, a secretariat and an international data center. The need to establish an executive council will be made clear only after we come to know how frequently the conference of the states parties can meet.

　 The secretariat should be of small size. In principle, the analysis and evaluation of data and information collected by monitoring system or presented by states parties should be conducted by each state party. But the secretariat can be involved in the analysis and evaluation of data and information so long as this function will not necessitate unwieldy enlargement of the secretariat.

　 Eighth : entry into force. I have already addressed our view on the question in the WG II. The CTBT, once it is established, should enter into force as soon as possible. It is very important that all the nuclear weapon countries adhere to it and all the nuclear capable countries become states parties to it. But it doesn't seem wise at this present time to admit to give any country or countries a power of veto. We think we can approach this question from a numerical point of view, for example 30 countries, but this question should be elaborated further by engaging ourselves in a more-detailed and thorough discussions.