(94.02.03)田中大使ＣＤ（一般演説）

　 Following the successful conclusion of the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conference seemed to undergo a transitional period last year, searching for its new priority tasks to be addressed. At the time when the "raison d'etre" of the Conference was questioned as we saw dramatic changes in the international security environment surrounding arms control and disarmament, the Conference succeeded in smoothly starting its work by adopting pragmatic methods without wasting too much time on procedural debates as had often been the case before.

　 A breakthrough was achieved on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which had long been regarded as an issue of the highest priority of the Conference. In the favorable political circumstances created by declared or de facto testing moratorium of nuclear weapon states, a historic decision was taken on August 10 to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Building on this decision, a draft specific mandate for the negotiations was agreed to, during the course of the intersessional consultations, and was formally adopted at the beginning of this year's session of the Conference on January 25, Mr. President, under your presidency. The mandate, I believe, has laid an appropriate ground for the forthcoming substantive negotiations on this important issue. Also at the last plenary on Tuesday, we could agree to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I, having had the privilege to chair the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban last year, am very much pleased by these developments and would like to take this opportunity to thank all my colleagues here for their cooperation extended to me. I also would like to congratulate Ambassador Marin-Bosch of Mexico on having been elected Chairman of the Committee this year to lead the important negotiations, and express our hope that the Committee will make an important progress under his chairmanship.

　 Japan has long attached a greatest importance to the issue of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Another landmark last year was the consensus adoption by the UN General Assembly of the CTB resolution urging the Conference to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. My delegation has a definite objective for the 1994 session of the Conference and I believe that this objective is shared by all delegations which have assembled here. Namely, we will make every possible effort to contribute to a rapid progress of the negotiations on a CTBT. In so doing, my delegation urges at the same time all nuclear weapon states to continue to refrain from testing to maintain the present political climate favorable to the CTBT negotiations.

　 It is, of course, the matter for the Ad Hoc Committee itself to work out in detail how the negotiations are to be initiated. At this stage I confine myself to stating that it is the hope of Japan that we will discuss the basic elements of the treaty and identify the key issues to be addressed in an efficient manner, so that we may be able to start the drafting of a CTB treaty text as soon as possible. It is not appropriate to set artificial deadlines for the entire negotiations of the treaty, since if we rush we may end up with an incomplete and inappropriate content of the treaty. Nevertheless it is essential to proceed to the drafting work at an earliest possible date.

　 Having said this, I would like to introduce our preliminary views on some of the basic elements of the treaty. As to the scope of a CTBT, Japan is of the view that any nuclear weapon test explosion should be prohibited, including those which are called "peaceful nuclear explosions".

　 The question of verification is the most difficult but important issue in the negotiations of a CTBT. We understand out of the discussions we have had so far that there is a general agreement that the seismic network which has been elaborated over many years by the Group of Seismic Experts (GSE) can provide an effective means of verification. We should be reminded, however, that the next technical test by the GSE to be conducted with a view to establishing the network (GSETT 3) will only begin in January 1995 and that in the meantime a number of points remain to be clarified, including such points as, for instance, how much it would cost to set up the network and how such a network would be operated. Therefore, it is essential to find solutions to these questions as soon as possible in order to reach an early conclusion of the negotiations of a CTBT. From this standpoint, Japan decided to host a workshop on CTB verification in the middle of March this year, to consider the problems of CTB verification mainly based on the seismological methods, for the purpose of contributing to the promotion of the CTBT negotiations.

　 As to the verification system itself, we should aim to elaborate an effective verification regime, based on the combination of a monitoring system, of which the seismic monitoring network will be the key component, and on-site inspection. At the same time, due consideration should be given to the achievement of cost-effectiveness of a verification regime by making extensive use of national technical means of state parties to the treaty. Furthermore, such a verification regime needs to be flexible to adapt itself to the advancement of technologies, and to improve the capability of detecting smaller and covert nuclear explosions.

　 With regard to on-site inspection, the points to be addressed are such matters as when it is needed, how it is conducted and what is the range and contents of activities. For the elaboration of these points, our experience in the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention may serve as good guidance.

　 My delegation welcomes that Ambassador Shannon of Canada was appointed as special coordinator on the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices ("Cut-Off" ). My delegation hopes that forthcoming consultations under Ambassador Shannon on this new subject entrusted to the Conference will lay the foundation for the negotiations in the near future. The question of "Cut-Off" is directly related to nuclear non-proliferation and, in that sense it is the one which should go hand in hand with a CTBT. Therefore, Japan thinks it appropriate that a "Cut-Off" convention be negotiated here in the Conference on Disarmament while appreciating that detailed technical elaboration on verification and safeguards may be entrusted to the IAEA.

　 On the question of Negative Security Assurance (NSA), various views were expressed last year, but regrettably no tangible outcome emerged in terms of negotiating a treaty text. I hope that some substantive progress will be achieved this year at the re-established Ad Hoc Committee on NSA under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany.

　 As to Transparency in Armaments (TIA), last year the Conference established, for the first time in its history, an Ad Hoc Committee on TIA where a number of concrete proposals were put forward and intensive discussions were carried out. My delegation was encouraged by these developments. As for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, more than eighty countries participated in its first year, which is, in our view, worth appreciation as a good start.

　This year, there will be three meetings of the governmental experts to discuss further development of the Register. Japan looks forward to hearing a successful outcome of the meetings. Also here in the Conference on Disarmament, we should continue our deliberations on TIA as an important issue which requires sustained efforts. We hope that more constructive deliberations than last year will be made, in particular on the question of military holdings and procurement through national production.

　 I believe that the negotiations and deliberations in the field of nuclear disarmament to be held this year in the Conference, especially on the matters of a CTBT, "Cut-Off" and NSA, are decisively important in building a favorable political environment which will have an impact on the success of the NPT Review and Extension Conference to be held next year. We believe that the Conference has a sufficient potential to deal successfully with these issues. The maximum use should be made of this potential to realise the hopes of the international community for greater stability and security.