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At The First
Committee of the 70th Session
of the General Assembly
- Thematic Debate:
Nuclear Weapons -
21 October 2015,
New York
Mr. Chairman,
Unfortunately, the 2015 NPT Review Conference was
unable to produce a consensus outcome document
which was expected to provide
us with concrete guidelines for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for
the review cycle up to the 2020 Review Conference. However, we should neither
overestimate nor underestimate the result of the Review Conference. A lack of
agreement at this time does not mean we have a shortage of political will among
Member States to take a united action towards a world free of nuclear weapons. At
the same time, the absence of an agreement means that we lost the sense of
direction toward the 2020 Review Conference. We are afraid that the nuclear non-proliferation
structure will gradually be unraveled and an overarching security architecture
based on the NPT will be wavered. Now we should do whatever we can to strengthen
the NPT regime, which has been a linchpin for international peace and security
over the past century. What is most important to do is to carry out the Action
Plan of 2010 and other measures agreed to in the past Review Conferences in
1995 and 2000.
Mr. Chairman,
Bearing this in mind, we would like to underscore the following
points from our national perspectives.
First, although the
NPT faces serious challenges, it remains the most universal treaty to secure
the world’s peace and stability. Therefore, we continue to underline the
importance of universality of the treaty and urge non-States Parties to accede to
it as non-nuclear weapon states without delay and without conditions to
strengthen the NPT regime.
Second, we believe that the Russian
and US leadership based upon mutual trust is indispensable for further
reduction of nuclear arsenals, and eventual global nuclear stockpile reduction involving
other States that possess nuclear weapons. We urge Russia and the US to resume
negotiations as soon as possible.
Third, in this vein, we expect
that the continuation of dialogue among the five nuclear-weapon States, or “N5 Process,”
is valid and effective not only for confidence building among them but will
also serve as a basis for future multilateral negotiations among States possessing
nuclear weapons. We call upon all nuclear-weapon States to fulfill the
obligation of Article VI of the NPT and renew their commitments made in the
2000 NPT Review Conference.
Fourth, Japan encourages the five
nuclear-weapon States to take, on a voluntary basis, whichever disarmament
measures they can accomplish. Their voluntary actions will definitely be
welcomed and contribute to filling the gap of trust and confidence between
nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, which is imperative to uphold the NPT
regime. Among other things, the continuation of reporting should be
underscored. We look forward to seeing the detailed regular reports by the N5
to the PrepComs, which will provide Member States an
opportunity to discuss their reports.
Fifth, the early entry into force
of the CTBT and the early commencement of an FMCT remain an imminent issue. The
Japanese and Kazakhstan Foreign Ministers co-chaired “the Ninth Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the CTBT” in New York last month and adopted a final declaration
calling for the early entry into force of the CTBT. Japan urges all countries, particularly, the remaining eight Annex II States to ratify the Treaty to overcome internal
difficulties and manage to take prompt action. The report adopted by the FMCT GGE is expected
to increase momentum for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on
Disarmament (CD). Japan requests not only CD Member States, but all UN Member
States to seriously consider creative ways to start an FMCT negotiation. Furthermore,
until the entry into force of an FMCT, we urge all nuclear-weapon States and
states possessing nuclear warheads to seriously consider declaring or continue
to maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons or other explosive devices.
Sixth, Japan commends the UK,
Norway and US’ initiative on the International Partnership for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). Especially, Japan regards the US initiative as an important platform where both
nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States can work together to deepen their
understanding about the complex challenges involved in verification of the
entire life cycle of nuclear weapons. It is also valuable that this initiative
will bring them together under a cooperative framework with the aim of
developing and eventually applying new technologies and concepts to address
these challenges.
Mr. Chairman,
Seventh, resolving regional nuclear
proliferation issues through diplomatic dialogue is vital. We welcome the two agreements, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action between EU3+3 and Iran as well as the “Roadmap” between the IAEA and
Iran. In this regard, the DPRK’s on-going nuclear and missile development programme
is of grave concern to the whole international community. Japan strongly urges the
DPRK to refrain from provocations, abandon all nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programmes, and immediately cease all related
activities. Japan also urges the DPRK to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards
and credible and meaningful dialogue towards denuclearization.
Mr. Chairman,
Lastly,
against the backdrop of an increasingly severe security environment our country
faces, we reaffirm the necessity to continue to employ an appropriate national
security policy including nuclear deterrence. At the same time, the issue of humanitarian
impact of nuclear weapons in view of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences
of any use of nuclear weapons has become the political movement. As the only
country that has suffered from atomic bombings, Japan has always emphasized the
importance of raising awareness of humanitarian consequences of the use of
nuclear weapons. The humanitarian issue should underpin all approaches and
efforts of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and play not a dividing
but a bridging role to unite the entire international community. It should be
inclusive and serve as a catalyst for a united global action towards a world
free of nuclear weapons.
In conclusion, the cooperation between
nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States is indispensable to achieve
a world free of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon States must do their part
on non-proliferation obligations and nuclear-weapon States must do their part
on disarmament obligations. Japan is ready to work together with all States in
this regard.
Thank you.