STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. MARI AMANO
AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
JAPAN
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
THE 1259TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
“Cessation of the nuclear arms race and
nuclear disarmament” and on “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related
matters” with a general focus on the prohibition of the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices
GENEVA, 31 MAY 2012
Mr. President,
I would like to congratulate you Ambassador Kahiluoto,
on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I assure you of my delegation’s full support
and cooperation as you guide these thematic debates.
Mr.
President,
Japan
has been for many years consistent in its call for the total elimination of
nuclear weapons. It is also a widely
shared conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be
achieved overnight with a single piece of paper or a declaration. It requires a cumulative process of practical
and concrete measures. In this context,
it is obvious, as the Preamble of the NPT clearly indicates,
that the first step we have to make is the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. Quantity capping by banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes is indispensable
to this end. After the quality capping
by banning nuclear testing through the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a treaty banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, commonly known as an FMCT, is
therefore the next logical step towards realization of a world free of nuclear
weapons.
Indeed,
the issue of an FMCT has reached a level of sufficient maturity to start formal
negotiations. While we would like to
make it clear that substantive discussions on an FMCT in the plenary meeting
cannot be substitute for the negotiations, my delegation is ready to take part
in these meetings without prejudice to our national positions in actual
negotiations. As there are many issues
that make up an FMCT, I would like to highlight four major ones: core obligations,
definitions, verification, and existing stocks.
Mr. President,
(Core obligations)
Identifying the core obligation of an FMCT is the most important issue. In the various discussions to date, there has
been a consensus that a ban on the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices would be the core obligation of an FMCT.
As a logical
consequence of a ban on “future production”, the entry into force of an FMCT would
obligate the states possessing fissile material production facilities for
nuclear weapon purposes to close down, decommission, or convert those
facilities to non-nuclear-weapon purposes. Because the “reversion” of such facilities back
to nuclear weapon use would equate to de
facto production, it should be subject to
prohibition. Furthermore, the
“reversion” of fissile materials that states have voluntarily declared as
excess for national security needs should similarly be banned.
There are also some
other bans that we believe to be necessary. Firstly, the “diversion” of existing and future stocks of
fissile material for non-nuclear weapon purposes to weapons purposes would also
be substantially the same as production, and should be subject to prohibition. Secondly, receiving
fissile material for nuclear weapons from another state should be subject to a
ban, as such a “transfer” would have an equivalent effect of “production”. Thirdly, assisting
another state in its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons should
be prohibited.
Mr. President,
(Definition)
Next, I would like to touch upon
the issue of definitions. Bearing in
mind the intent and purpose of an FMCT, we have to make sure that no legal
loopholes will be created by inadvertently choosing narrow definitions. They should therefore be as broad as possible
while not adversely affecting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. From this perspective, we believe that
Article XX of the IAEA statute on “Special fissionable materials” could provide
a base for a definition of fissile materials.
Mr. President,
(Verification)
On the subject
of verification issues, there are many different approaches to verifying
compliance with the core obligation of an FMCT.
We believe there are four possible categories of verification to take
into consideration.
The first is to
confirm that the amount of stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices has not increased from the date an FMCT enters into
force. Under this category, it would be
necessary to declare all past production of fissile materials, while noting
some voices from the nuclear weapon states that making such declarations
mandatory may be challenging from the perspective of protecting proliferation-sensitive
information.
The second category
is to confirm that the reactors and facilities for the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices that are closed down,
decommissioned, or converted to non-nuclear-weapon purposes, remain in that
state. From the perspective of ensuring
the core obligation of an FMCT, it would be necessary and significant to confirm
that these facilities will never again “operate” as production facilities for
nuclear weapons. Moreover, verification
of this category would have the effect of substantially verifying a large part
of the first category and will be extremely important for improving confidence in
an FMCT.
The
third category is to confirm that fissile material that has voluntarily been
declared as excess as a result of nuclear disarmament is not reverted back to
nuclear weapons purposes. In this
connection, studying how the outcome of the Trilateral Initiative between the
United States, the Russian Federation, and the IAEA could be adapted to an FMCT
would be worthwhile. Furthermore, this
category of verification is particularly important to ensure the principle of
irreversibility.
The
fourth category is to confirm that fissile material for non-nuclear-weapon purposes
has not been diverted to nuclear-weapons.
Given that currently
“voluntary safeguards” are already applied to the NPT nuclear-weapon states, as
well as facility-specific 66-type safeguards to some facilities of non-NPT states
parties, this issue can be left to the discussions in the IAEA under its
assistance for the examination of verification arrangements for an FMCT. On the other hand, at present the
nuclear-weapon states under their “voluntary safeguards” may “withdraw” their declared
civil nuclear material from IAEA safeguards, but in the event that an FMCT is
established it may be necessary to revise such “withdrawal” provisions to
conform to the new FMCT obligations. In this regard, we would like to bring to mind the call made by the 2010 NPT Review Conference under
Action 30 for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear
facilities in the nuclear-weapon states. Furthermore, the NPT non-nuclear
weapon states which have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements and
Additional Protocols should bear neither additional measures nor obligations
under an FMCT.
Mr. President,
(Stocks)
The fourth major issue is stocks. We are aware of the fact that there is not yet
a convergence of views on this topic. It is not, however, productive to conduct
general debates on “whether existing stocks should be included or not” in an
FMCT. Rather, it is constructive to
precisely detail what specific obligations would be envisaged in regards to
existing stocks. In this context, the
transfer of stocks for nuclear weapons to a third country, the diversion to
nuclear-weapon purposes of stocks for conventional military use, and the
“reversion” back to nuclear-weapon purposes of stocks declared as excess should
be at least banned. At the same time,
there are further issues in relation to existing stocks that could be studied,
such as transparency-enhancing measures and realizing physical protection
obligations from the perspective of strengthening nuclear security.
Mr.
President,
Lastly,
I would like to take this opportunity to commend Germany and the Netherlands
for hosting FMCT experts meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday this week, which
were in the same vein as the three experts’ side events that Japan and
Australia held last year. Meetings such as these help to inform and support the work of the CD. At the same time, through the discussions of
this chamber on an FMCT, the positions of many delegations have been revealed
to the greatest extent possible and we have reached the point where we are all struggling
to say anything more specific or different in a non-negotiation format. It is therefore high time that we immediately
start negotiating this treaty.
Thank
you.