The 23rd United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Matsumoto
28 July 2011
Speech by H.E. Mr. Akio Suda
Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
I am glad that FMCT and the CD is on this year’s Conference agenda. Because for real progress on nuclear disarmament, we need a multi-layered approach that includes work and advocacy on issues from a grand strategy to specific and concrete steps.
Today, I will restrict my brief presentation to the advocacy of two points:
(1) The critical importance of the negotiations of an FMCT in the whole process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
(2) The structural problem of the CD which may hinder multilateral nuclear disarmament as a whole.
(The multi-layered approach)
When we talk about where we now stand concerning nuclear disarmament, we can list several important and positive movements over the past two or three years. The momentum seems to be high towards a world free of nuclear weapons. With this momentum, we should certainly intensify our discussions on the process of nuclear disarmament towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which should be ensured by a legal instrument at the end.
At the same time, we have to look at the reality. Besides some progress in nuclear weapons free zones and CTBT ratifications, there has been very little movement in multilateral nuclear disarmament since, say, the Prague speech more than two years ago or the NPT Review Conference last May.
During and after the 2010 NPT Revcon last May, in Japan and some other countries there appeared many good reports about its outcomes. However, I had a striking experience: the day after the Conference adopted the historic final document with an action plan, I was on board a plane flying back to Geneva from New York. I found no articles, not a single line about the NPT Revcon in the Times, the Post or any major English paper. This is the reality, the striking reality that we have to struggle with.
Of course, there are millions of students, NGOs and citizens who are engaged in the issue of nuclear disarmament and its advocacy. However, we need to keep in mind the severe reality of the public and the mass media around much of the world. It is really important to study and discuss the road to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and picture the goal. At the same time, in order not to make the goal a perpetual dream in the world of reality, it is even more important that we move forward with actual concrete steps and intensify the campaign towards these steps as well. The FMCT is such an urgent concrete step and we have to make progress quickly.
(The importance of FMCT)
If participants are asked today which they value more than others among several nuclear disarmament issues, for instance the CTBT (entry in force), FMCT (fissile material cutoff treaty), NSA (negative security assurances), a Nuclear Weapons Convention, or nuclear weapons free zones, an FMCT may come last or next to last in its popularity.
The assumed reasons for this may be:
1) The title of the treaty (FMCT or cut-off) is abstract and does not evoke a vivid image;
2) As at least four of the P5 have already declared a moratorium, it has little actual additional value;
3) It is only for non-proliferation unless it stipulates the reduction of stocks.
An FMCT is taken as a rather unspectacular (jimi) issue in comparison to other attractive grand issues, and I admit the name of the treaty is not very appealing. However, the other points mentioned above are all false.
In the process of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, to ban the production of the basic materials for nuclear weapon purposes, a cut-off provides a firm and indispensible basis for further disarmament.
How would this treaty affect states in different groups? Non-nuclear-weapon states of the NPT will not bear any additional obligations because they are already prohibited from such activities. Four of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states have already declared a moratorium, but all the five will be legally bound to non-production by the treaty. States outside the NPT will have to stop production if they are producing any material.
In a word, there is no further obligation on non-nuclear-weapon states, only a new legally binding obligation on the P5 and the states outside the NPT. And there is a widely shared principle that this treaty should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable.
The significant effects of the treaty include:
(1) No further proliferation among states outside the NPT, if of course they join the treaty. So we need to encourage them to participate in the negotiations.
(2) Reduce structural discrimination under the NPT, by obliging nuclear-weapon states of, at least, banning the production and receiving verification thereof.
(3) Lay a firm legal basis for the continuous reduction of the total number of nuclear weapons in the world by making the disarmament process irreversible. Once nuclear possessing states reduce their stockpiles of fissile materials voluntarily or by any reason, they cannot go back to the prior level.
These are significant effects that we can envisage even if the treaty is mainly focused on the future production. It is not true therefore that the FMCT would only serve non-proliferation and not disarmament.
Many of the CD members, including Japan, are concerned with the question of stocks in one way or another. Japan has been repeatedly stating its view, which is shared by many other states, which is that the treaty should at least provide some mechanism to monitor stocks so that no diversion or reversion of fissile material from other sources to stocks is allowed. For instance, if a nuclear-weapon states declares, as the US and Russia have done, some fissile material as excess for weapon purposes and transfer it to peaceful purposes, it is not allowed to revert it back to stocks.
Everybody knows the hypothesis that if the treaty would stipulate not only the future production ban but also the obligatory reduction of fissile material, it could directly compel nuclear disarmament by possessing states. It would be wonderful if most of nuclear possessing states would show interest in negotiating such an ideal ”fissile material treaty”, but we know that won’t happen for many years to come. Then there are two choices for those countries and people who wish real progress in nuclear disarmament: whether we will do nothing on legal frameworks concerning fissile material for the foreseeable future, or we immediately start negotiations on an FMCT banning the future production and managing stocks in possible ways. The first choice would leave us no gains. The second choice would open the door for further steps on various fronts of nuclear disarmament in the future.
(The problem of the CD)
Then why is the commencement of negotiations on FMCT blocked in the CD?
I don’t like to get into details of procedural matters of the CD here. But the point is that one member state keeps opposing the start of the negotiations for the reason, among others, that the treaty to be negotiated is only to prohibit the future production and not to obligate the reduction of stocks. This is tantamount, in real diplomacy, to demanding all the nuclear possessing states to accept something impossible before even starting negotiations at all.
Still if such a position were stated by some non-nuclear weapon states that are earnest for drastic disarmament progress, it might be understandable if not practical. However, strangely, the opposition with this reasoning comes from one of the nuclear possessing states. When most of the member states agree to start negotiations on at least banning production of fissile material while not excluding addressing the question of stocks as well, one state who possesses nuclear weapons rejects negotiations on such a ban by saying it’s not enough. I will stop talking here about the present peculiar situation of the CD.
Rather, I would like to talk about the serious structural problems of the CD which the present situation is clearly illustrating.
The CD has three unique characteristics, the combination of which could, if badly used, not only paralyze its own function but also hamper the progress of global multilateral nuclear disarmament.
The first characteristic is the inclusion of all the nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons among its 65 members. The second characteristic is the strict consensus rule. And the third is the CD’s believed role as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, particularly on nuclear disarmament. These three characteristics can be valuable features of the CD as long as the CD is functioning productively. But the combination of these three characteristics could have a poisonous effect.
With these three characteristics, any single nuclear weapon possessing state can logically block even the start of any negotiations on a disarmament issue. Since all the nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons participate in the CD, which is a good thing, and since the CD is said to be the sole multilateral negotiating body on treaties concerning disarmament, just one member, including any of the nuclear weapon possessors, can, by misusing the consensus rule, veto even the start of any negotiations on nuclear disarmament in itself and in the whole world.
Unless the entire world squarely recognize this fundamental structural problem of the CD and makes it start to work in a more cooperative and constructive manner, it may lose its relevance in the disarmament efforts of the world. This serious problem should be addressed not only in the CD but also in the UN and any international forums including this conference, because the present situation of the CD with this structural problem is now affecting not just the CD itself but the process of nuclear disarmament of the whole world.