Statement by H.E. Mr. Akio Suda

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan

to the Conference on Disarmament

 

Geneva, 3 February 2011

 

 

Mr. President,

 

On Tuesday, I listened carefully with great interest to the significant statements made by my many colleagues on the subject of nuclear disarmament. I found that all the delegates who spoke shared the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons despite differences in approach and national and regional security concerns.

 

Japan has also been standing firm for many decades in its call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are willing to participate in discussions, with a longer perspective, on how a multilateral nuclear disarmament framework or a nuclear weapons convention should look like in the future final phase of nuclear disarmament.

 

However, everybody agrees that total elimination cannot be achieved over night or by a single convention. It requires a cumulative process of practical and concrete measures. In this regard, it is obvious, as the Preamble of the NPT indicates, that the most urgent step in this process is the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. I cannot imagine taking any road towards a world free of nuclear weapons after the CTBT without firstly banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

 

The issue of an FMCT has reached a level of sufficient maturity for us to embark on formal negotiations. Nonetheless, my delegation is pleased to actively take part in substantive discussions on an FMCT in the plenary meetings without prejudice to our national position in actual negotiations. Now, I would like to highlight some of our thoughts concerning the major issues of an FMCT.   

 

(Core obligations)

Firstly, the most important issue is to identify the core obligations of an FMCT: what is prohibited and what is not. 

 

The first core obligation is, needless to say, the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from the date of the entry into force of an FMCT. 

 

As a logical consequence of a ban on “future production”, the entry into force of an FMCT would obligate the states possessing fissile material production facilities for nuclear-weapons purposes to close-down or decommission such facilities, or convert them to non-nuclear weapons uses.  The “reversion” of closed-down or decommissioned facilities back to the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes should be subject to a ban, since such a “reversion” would mean nothing less than de facto “production”. 

 

There are some other prohibitions that my delegation believes to be necessary in order to ensure, at the minimum, the non-increase of fissile materials for weapons purposes possessed by a state. 

 

(1)          The “reversion” of fissile material that states have voluntarily declared as excess for national security needs should similarly be subject to a ban.

(2)          Furthermore, the “diversion” after the entry into force of an FMCT of existing and future stocks for non-nuclear weapons purposes to nuclear weapons purposes should be subject to a ban, as such a “diversion” would be substantially the same as “production”. 

(3)          Receiving fissile material for nuclear weapons from another state should be subject to a ban under an FMCT, since such a “transfer” would have the equivalent effect of “production”.

 

Furthermore, an FMCT should also ban assisting another state in its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

 

Moreover, considering the current importance of strengthening nuclear security, it might be worth looking at the possibility of realizing not only a production ban, but also obligations of state accounting and control and physical protection, as well as a ban on the transfer of stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

 

(Definition)

Next, I would like to touch upon the issue of definitions.  Bearing in mind the intent and purpose of an FMCT, Japan’s basic approach to “definitions” is that they should be as broad as possible while not adversely affecting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

 

From this perspective, Japan believes that the general purpose criterion is the most appropriate for an FMCT.  You can find this approach in other disarmament treaties, like the CWC and the BTWC.  This would prohibit the production of any fissile material for the purpose of use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  The dual nature of fissile material like in other disarmament treaties makes this approach relevant to an FMCT.  If a clearer definition is needed, we believe Article XX of the IAEA statute on “Special fissionable materials” could provide a base for such a definition.

 

Some may argue that if we adopt too broad a definition of fissile materials to be prohibited from production for weapons purposes, we will face practical difficulties in carrying out verification.  We understand the logic behind those arguments.  But the scope of “fissile material” in terms of verification should be discussed in relation to verification issues. 

 

(Verification)

On the subject of verification issues, there are many different approaches to the verification of the core obligation of an FMCT, which is a “ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices”.  We believe the core obligation of an FMCT could be verified in the following way:

 

(1)          Confirm that the amount of fissile material stock for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices has not increased from the date an FMCT enters into force.

(2)          Confirm that the reactors and facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices that are closed-down, decommissioned or converted to non-nuclear weapons uses remain in this state.

(3)          Confirm that fissile material that has voluntarily been declared as excess as a result of nuclear disarmament is not reverted back to nuclear weapons purposes.

(4)          Confirm that fissile material for non-nuclear weapons purposes has not been diverted to nuclear weapons purposes.

 

Firstly, in order to confirm the aforesaid 1st category (confirmation that the amount of stock for nuclear weapons has not increased after the entry into force), it would be necessary to declare all information regarding the types and amounts of stocks that are the product of “past production”.  Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that from various perspectives, for instance, proliferation-sensitive information, it would be unrealistic to make such declarations mandatory, and this needs to be carefully examined.  However, it would be worth examining the possibility of some kind of transparency-enhancing measure, such as voluntary declarations.  It should be noted here, as it has often been pointed out, that even if stocks are declared, the “identification of production time” or the “identification of production purpose” would be difficult.  In this regard, in-depth technical examinations by scientists are urgently needed. 

 

In relation to the aforesaid 2nd category (confirmation that facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons that are closed-down, decommissioned or converted to non-nuclear weapons uses remain so), after concluding an FMCT, fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons in States Parties will inevitably be closed-down, decommissioned or converted to non-nuclear weapons uses.  From the perspective of ensuring the core obligation of an FMCT, confirmation that those facilities, at least the facilities closed-down, decommissioned or converted to civil use, will never again “operate” as production facilities for nuclear weapons purposes is necessary and significant.  Moreover, verification of this category would have the effect of substantially verifying a large part of the 1st category and will be extremely important for improving the confidence of an FMCT.

 

With regard to the aforesaid 3rd category (confirmation that fissile material that has voluntarily been declared as excess as a result of nuclear disarmament is not reverted back to nuclear weapons purposes), close examinations on this subject took place in the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA.  Examining the integration of the 3rd category into an FMCT with reference to this initiative would also be significant from the perspective of legally ensuring “irreversibility”.

 

In relation to the aforesaid 4th category, based on the current situation in which “voluntary safeguards” are already applied to the NPT nuclear-weapon States, as well as facility-specific 66-type safeguards to some facilities of non-NPT States Parties, this issue can be left to the discussions in the IAEA under its assistance for the examination of verification arrangements for an FMCT.  On the other hand, at present the nuclear-weapon States under their “voluntary safeguards” may “withdraw” their declared civil nuclear material from IAEA safeguards, but in the event that an FMCT is established it may be necessary to revise such “withdrawal” provisions to conform to the new FMCT obligations.  In this regard, we would like to remind this Conference of the call made by the 2010 NPT Review Conference in Action 30 for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States.  Furthermore, the NPT non-nuclear weapon States which have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols should bear neither additional measures nor obligations under an FMCT.

 

(Stocks)

Finally, let me touch upon the issue of stocks.  This issue has often been hijacked by the general question of whether to include existing stocks or not in the scope of an FMCT.  We believe that it would be beneficial to discuss this issue based on what “existing stocks” and “inclusion in the scope” respectively mean under an FMCT. 

 

We would suggest three different categories of stocks: (1) stocks for nuclear weapons purposes, (2) stocks for non-explosive purposes (conventional military purposes), and (3) stocks declared excess to military requirements.

 

Firstly, we must wait until discussions converge on whether to include a future reduction/elimination obligation for the first category of stocks.  However, at the very least the transfer to a third country should be banned.  Additionally it would be worth examining the addition of strict state accounting and control obligations, transparency-enhancing measures, such as voluntary declarations, and physical protection obligations from the perspective of strengthening nuclear security.

 

Next, in relation to stocks for non-explosive purposes (conventional military purposes), it will be necessary to at least include a prohibition on the diversion to nuclear weapons purposes.  Again it would be worth examining the addition of strict state accounting and control obligations, transparency-enhancing measures such as voluntary declarations and physical protection obligations from the perspective of strengthening nuclear security.

 

Lastly, the “reversion” back of stock declared excess to defense purposes (nuclear weapons purposes and conventional military purposes), in other words, its diversion to nuclear weapons purposes, should be prohibited.  Furthermore, for stocks once declared as excess, it would be possible to examine realizing obligations to place them under verification and to reduce and eliminate such stocks in the future.

 

Through a detailed examination like this, the feasible parameters for the inclusion of existing stocks could be established rather than conducting general debates on “whether existing stocks should be included or not”.

 

Mr. President,

 

In the last several years, we have discussed these issues over and over.  It is high time for starting negotiations.  At the same time, close technical and scientific examinations are also overdue.  In this regard, Japan looks forward to discussing these issues in depth at a technical side event with the participation of experts.  

 

Thank you.