Statement by H.E. Mr. Sumio Tarui

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan

to the Conference on Disarmament

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee

for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

- Cluster III Specific Issue : -

Other provisions of the Treaty, including Article X

Geneva, 7 May 2008

Mr. Chairman,

The issue of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is one of the most critical and urgent problems facing the NPT regime, and a matter of great importance to Japan. If the withdrawal of a State Party is ignored after it has acquired clandestinely the capability to produce nuclear weapons, this could in addition to provoking regional and international security concerns, seriously affect Treaty universality as well as confidence in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime which is based on the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, this issue was actively discussed. Based on these debates, in last year’s PrepCom the States Parties submitted concrete proposals and engaged in a vigorous exchange of views. It is our opinion that these efforts have further deepened deliberations on withdrawal. In line with these developments, the Government of Japan has submitted its own working paper to the current PrepCom. One of the aims of our working paper is to encourage the convergence of discussions related to withdrawal based on the deliberations to date.

The pertinent sections of the Chairman’s working paper of the first Preparatory Committee summarize in a well-balanced manner the aforesaid deliberations. We consider that this summary provides a good foundation for the narrowing of discussions towards agreement. Like the Chairman’s working paper also reflects, Japan thinks the past deliberations on withdrawal have developed a common awareness on the significance of the following points:

Firstly, a State that has withdrawn from the NPT remains responsible for any violations it committed whilst a Party to the Treaty. This is also clear in international law.

Secondly, a State that has withdrawn, is not allowed to use nuclear materials, facilities and technologies which it has imported from another State Party under the pretext of peaceful use while a party to the Treaty, for any other purposes except peaceful. To that end, the possibility of maintaining IAEA safeguards after withdrawal must be examined. Additionally, although the Chairman’s working paper doesn’t specifically mention this point, it is nonetheless crucial that any supplier country of nuclear material, facilities and technologies to a State withdrawn from the NPT, make the necessary arrangements for the return or neutralization of the items transferred prior to withdrawal.

Thirdly, withdrawal from the NPT, especially by a State in violation of the Treaty, is an issue deeply connected to international peace and security. Japan believes there is a shared understanding among the States Parties on the importance of appropriate international responses, particularly on the role of the UN Security Council, for dealing with this matter. As a concrete proposal, it was put forward that the UN Security Council convene automatically and immediately when any State gives notice of withdrawal; and that verification of the withdrawing State’s compliance with the Treaty be enforced by way of a UN Security Council decision. We need to be mindful, however, that a great deal depends on the intentions of the UN Security Council in relation to the feasibility of such a proposal. Nevertheless, given that withdrawal from the NPT is intimately related to international peace and security, Japan shares the recognition that in the situation of a notice of withdrawal being received, the Security Council is required to appropriately fulfill its duty in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Fourthly, there have been deliberations on a consultation mechanism to seek reconsideration by a State announcing its intention to withdraw from the Treaty. We believe there is a shared recognition of the importance of such consultations. A number of ideas related to specific measures already exist, such as consultations by the depository states, convening extraordinary meetings of the States Parties and regional initiatives. Japan, in this regard, considers that a flexible approach capable of responding on a case-by-case basis is appropriate.

Mr. Chairman,

One additional objective of Japan’s working paper is to encourage the States Parties to embrace a much broader perspective on the issue of withdrawal. Specifically, Japan would like to present a proposition that reaffirming the benefits of participating in the NPT regime and reinforcing these benefits are integral for preventing withdrawal from the Treaty. We have highlighted the following, among others, as benefits to the NPT:

First, the effectiveness of the NPT, which has contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security, as a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

Second, the preferential treatment that should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as confirmed by paragraph 16 of the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

Third, the negative security assurances granted under the relevant declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States to the NPT non-nuclear-weapon States and, taken note of by UN Security Council Resolution 984.

Furthermore, I would like to point out that progress in nuclear disarmament is also indispensable for the non-nuclear-weapon States, which make up an overwhelming majority of the NPT States Parties, in order to reassure and elicit their complete confidence in the NPT.

Japan is of the belief that confirming and reinforcing the aforementioned benefits of the NPT will strengthen the NPT regime, and that will lead to preventing withdrawal from the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

Withdrawal is one of the critical issues to be addressed within the review process for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We are convinced that establishing a meaningful agreement on this issue at the 2010 Review Conference is a distinct possibility. To that end, it is Japan’s intention to continue contributing actively to the discussions on this matter.

Thank you Mr. President.