Ambassador Sumio TARUI, Permanent Representative of Japan

to the Conference on Disarmament

“The necessity of bold nuclear disarmament initiatives by the nuclear-weapon States"

UN Conference on Disarmament Issues, Sapporo

27 August 2007

Excellencies,

Distinguished conference participants, ladies and gentlemen,

At the outset, allow me to express my gratitude to the organizers for giving me this opportunity to address the 19^th UN Conference on Disarmament Issues here in Sapporo. Holding events such as this one, in a different city of Japan each year, helps draw attention to the importance of disarmament and arms control at the local level. Efforts like these encapsulate the philosophy of “think globally, act locally”.

With this in mind, I would like to convey my appreciation to the honourable Governor of Hokkaido, Ms. Harumi Takahashi, and the Mayor of Sapporo, Mr. Fumio Ueda. I would also like to welcome to this Conference the Mayor of Hiroshima – Mr. Tadatoshi Akiba. In this vein, I would also like to convey how shocked and saddened we were to hear about the death of the previous Mayor of Nagasaki, Mr. Iccho Itoh, in April this year. It was of particular significance, therefore, that I greeted in Geneva last week this year’s Nagasaki High School Peace Messengers. It is the younger generation, such as the High School Peace Messengers, that will carry the torch toward our goal of the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, in order to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons, we need to not only “act locally” but also to “act globally”. It is thus my intention today to focus on the necessity of bold nuclear disarmament initiatives by the nuclear-weapon States.

The Necessity of Bold Nuclear Disarmament Initiatives

As Prime Minister Abe said at the Peace Memorial Ceremonies a few weeks ago, as the only country in the history of humankind to experience the devastation of atomic bombings, Japan has a special responsibility to convey our grievous experience to the international community. He also emphasized his conviction that the human tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki must never be repeated in any place on Earth. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is thus a goal that has particular resonance for Japan. In addition to humanitarian considerations, nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States is a necessary condition for international peace and security as well as its stability, based on the premise that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime must be preserved as one of the core foundations of international relations. To explain this, let me give you a brief overview of the negotiation history of the NPT.

As the title rightly indicates, one of the key objectives of the NPT is, no doubt, to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In other words, nuclear weapons must not be proliferated any further than the level reached at the time of signing the Treaty. This is based on the assumption that further proliferation would destabilize international relations and adversely affect international peace and security. This assumption of “more will be worse” won over the other plausible view of “more may be better”, and has now become accepted theory. It is, therefore, obvious that all the States Parties to the NPT, upon their accession, must fully fulfill their non-proliferation obligations as a matter of priority.

Nevertheless, the negotiators of the NPT were fully aware that if the treaty only contained non-proliferation obligations it would not be sustainable for the future because of its discriminatory nature. There was a common understanding among all negotiating parties, including nuclear-weapon States, that non-proliferation is not an end in itself, but a step towards nuclear disarmament. The statement by the Government of Japan at the time of signing the Treaty also declared, “this Treaty will serve as a first step towards nuclear disarmament”, and the “discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States from their national arsenals.”

A focus of negotiations was therefore placed on how to reflect the objective of nuclear disarmament in the Treaty. Some countries insisted that non-proliferation obligations would be gradually fulfilled in line with progress on nuclear disarmament. Other countries insisted on the insertion of specific disarmament measures within the Treaty. On the other hand, while the nuclear-weapon States emphasized that non-proliferation obligations should not be linked with nuclear disarmament, they too shared the understanding that non-proliferation is not an end in itself, but a step towards nuclear disarmament. Both draft treaties circulated by the United States and the Soviet Union omitted any operational provision on disarmament, but did include disarmament objectives in the preamble.

As a compromise, a number of non-nuclear-weapon States proposed the insertion of an operational paragraph declaring the intentions of the nuclear-weapon States, which received widespread support among non-nuclear-weapon States. This is how the provision on nuclear disarmament, Article VI of the Treaty, came about.

The significance of this Article was, and has been, widely recognized. Upon the signing of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States did not express any reservations, but rather gave positive views on the significance of Article VI. For example, the United States stated that the permanent survivability of the Treaty would mainly depend on the success of the future negotiations slated in Article VI. A prominent US law professor also noted, “the single most important provision of the NPT from the standpoint of long-term success or failure of its goal of proliferation prevention, is Article VI.” He further noted, “While the basic prophylactic provisions are in Articles I and II, the credibility and integrity of those provisions will, in time, be no better than the performance of the nuclear-weapon States under the provisions of Article VI.”

Today, the significance of Article VI in the birth of the Treaty has by no means been lost, but has grown ever greater. An increasing number of non-nuclear-weapon States have expressed their disappointment and dismay over the slow progress on nuclear disarmament. As the expectations were high after the agreement on the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the disappointment quickly deepened as it became apparent that many of the promises made in 2000 were not being kept, nor, seemingly, ever would be. Whether such a perception is warranted is not the issue at hand; the real issue is the sheer fact that the disappointment is mounting. Moreover, if such discontent were to continue, it would lead to an erosion of confidence in the Treaty at a time when the international community needs to be united to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Since the dismay is so deep, not just “nuclear disarmament” but “bold nuclear disarmament” would help boost the recovery of the ever-declining confidence in the Treaty over the past decade. I would not dare to say that nuclear disarmament would fix the proliferation problems we face today. Still, nuclear disarmament initiatives, or “bold nuclear disarmament initiatives”, could boost the restoration of long-term confidence in the Treaty, which would in turn form a united front against proliferation. The then UK Foreign Secretary, Ms. Margaret Beckett, in her major speech made on 25 June in Washington to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference also pointed out that the “bargain” between the haves and have-nots requires nuclear-weapon States to do more on nuclear disarmament to get more on the non-proliferation front.

On the other hand, non-proliferation initiatives by non-nuclear-weapon States would also greatly contribute to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States, as it would create the necessary conditions for further nuclear disarmament. In particular, the nuclear programs of the DPRK and Iran must be resolved, by their fulfilling the obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The DPRK must fully implement the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 of the Six-Party Talks, abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and come into full compliance with the NPT’s obligations. We urge Iran to comply with the resolutions by the UNSC and the IAEA Board of Governors and to suspend all enrichment-related activities.

Although the focus of my speech today is on nuclear disarmament, I would like to emphasize that for the Treaty to remain effective and sustainable, both non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives are indispensable.

What Would Be “Bold Nuclear Disarmament Initiatives”?

What would then constitute “Bold Nuclear Disarmament Initiatives”? For this, we do not need to come up with anything spectacular. For example, the Chair’s Working Paper (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.78) of the 1^st Preparatory Committee for the 8^th Review Conference of the NPT, held in May this year in Vienna, could be an illustrative reference. As Ambassador Amano explained earlier, this working paper was planned to be issued as “the Chair’s factual summary” to reflect the discussions in the most factual and balanced manner possible. We can therefore expect that the main ideas for nuclear disarmament proposed by the NPT States Parties are included in this working paper.

Some of the action-oriented measures contained in the Chair’s Working Paper are, for example, the full implementation of the thirteen practical steps including the unequivocal undertaking contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; the development of a nuclear weapons convention; securing greater information from the nuclear-weapon States on the active and reserve status of nuclear arsenals; increasing transparency and accountability with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities such as through annual briefings; the compilation by the Secretariat of a comparative table recording measures undertaken by nuclear-weapons States in complying with their obligations under Article VI, for tabling at the 2010 Review Conference; and, the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 by the US and Russia regarding the reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons.

With regard to the issue of replacement or modernization of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platform, the Chair’s Working Paper notes that “concern and disappointment were voiced about plans” on such moves, and that “In response to the concerns addressed to the United States and the United Kingdom, they provided their clarifications and explanations on their efforts towards nuclear disarmament.”

Every year Japan submits to the United Nations General Assembly a nuclear disarmament resolution containing bold nuclear disarmament measures. For instance, our resolution refers to as disarmament measures: a successful NPT review process; deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner; nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Moscow Treaty; further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies; the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the resumption of substantive work at the Conference on Disarmament; and the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

An overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States adopts this resolution with these measures every year, and as they receive such evident broad support we could consider them realistic, yet bold. What’s more, I have not officially heard any other nuclear-weapon State voice particular opposition to these nuclear disarmament measures, except for the objection on one specific issue from one nuclear-weapon State, who nevertheless stated that it considered this resolution as the most balanced and realistic of all the resolutions introduced on nuclear disarmament. The international community should therefore re-evaluate this important UN resolution on nuclear disarmament and follow up whether the nuclear-weapon States are implementing the measures contained within the resolution. I have explained why they need to be done. Now, they just need to be carried out.

I would also like to emphasize strongly the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a nuclear disarmament measure. It may not look “bold”, but is very important in the long term.

Concluding Remarks

As the Japanese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, I was heartened by the speech made by Ms. Beckett in June, which came at the time when the second part of this year’s session of the CD was about to come to a discouraging conclusion, being unable to agree to a program of work. Taking it at face value, the speech gives us a high hope for nuclear disarmament. I was particularly interested in the announcement that the UK – as a “disarmament laboratory” – will participate in a new project by the International Institute of Strategic Studies on the practical steps required for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and will undertake further detailed work at the Atomic Weapons Establishment on the “nuts and bolts” of nuclear disarmament. Such a practical approach to conducting actual research on what nuclear disarmament entails is a notable example that even non-nuclear-weapon States, including Japan, should follow. I would also urge all the nuclear-weapon States to follow the UK’s approach to nuclear disarmament initiatives.

Although I was optimistic about the prospects for nuclear disarmament after hearing the UK Foreign Secretary’s speech, the Conference on Disarmament in the third part of this year’s session has not yet been able to agree to a program of work. This is a great disappointment to us all. We have never come closer to consensus in the past 10 years. Yet, the reservations of one nuclear-weapon State, one country that has declared to possess nuclear weapons, and, surprisingly enough, one non-nuclear-weapon State, have kept us in limbo. We cannot allow this deadlock in a multilateral forum to continue, in addition to the slow progress in nuclear disarmament, which we often tend to blame on the nuclear-weapon States. The CD should set an example for “bold nuclear disarmament initiatives” and immediately commence negotiations on an FMCT.

Thank you for your attention.