Mr.
Chairman,
In
the discussions in Cluster I, I delivered Japan's basic position on nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. During this Special Time, along with our statement
on specific measures for nuclear disarmament, we would like to put forward our
basic position on security assurances.
Mr.
Chairman,
As
we expressed during the general debate and in our Cluster I statement, the past
outcomes including those of 1995 and 2000 must be respected to their fullest
possible extent. Firstly, the nuclear-weapon States need to take further
measures leading to nuclear disarmament, as agreed to under article VI of the
NPT, such as deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, while
respecting the "unequivocal undertaking" they committed themselves to
in 2000 to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Japan
welcomes the steady progress by the nuclear-weapon States, including the United
States and the Russian Federation, in reducing their nuclear arsenals.
Nevertheless, while an estimated 27,000 nuclear weapons still remain in
existence, it is patently clear that further concrete efforts to reduce nuclear
arsenals are required. Japan urges the Russian Federation and the United States
to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), and to
undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for in the Treaty in an
irreversible and verifiable manner. From this perspective, Japan is paying
close attention to the talks between the Russia Federation and the U.S.
concerning the fate of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Furthermore, it is vital that these efforts to reduce nuclear weapons progress
transparently. In this connection, we welcome in the discussions of the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) the presentations based on solid figures from
some nuclear-weapon States on their nuclear disarmament measures. Japan
strongly encourages all the nuclear-weapon States to give due attention to
greater transparency in nuclear disarmament.
Next,
the nuclear-weapon States should further lower the operational status of
nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and
security. Additionally, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security
policies minimizes the risk that they will ever be used, and is indispensable
for promoting the process of their total elimination.
Mr.
Chairman,
To
realize the complete elimination of nuclear arms it is necessary to halt the
manufacture of such weapons. In this regard, both a qualitative and
quantitative cap are essential and significant. In relation to a qualitative
cap, the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) is a realistic issue. All the countries that have yet to sign or ratify
the CTBT should do so without delay. As the Fifth Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the CTBT will be held in September this year, Japan
intends to heighten the momentum for the prompt entry into force of the treaty
in support of this Conference. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we
urge states to maintain the moratorium on nuclear test explosion. Japan once
again condemns the 9 October nuclear test by the DPRK. In this respect, efforts
towards the establishment of a verification system for the nuclear test ban
including the International Monitoring System (IMS), which demonstrated its
effectiveness on the occasion of the DPRK test, are also vital.
If
the CTBT is the key measure to cap qualitatively the manufacture of nuclear
weapons, then the quantitative cap is a fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT).
This means that at present an FMCT is the most practical multilateral measure
for nuclear disarmament. In this connection, the proposed presidential draft
decision of the Six CD Presidents, which aims to overcome the decade long
impasse and get the Conference back to substantive work, is a realistic and
carefully worded compromise. For advancing nuclear disarmament, which is the
objective of all NPT States Parties, we cannot miss this opportunity; instead,
we must immediately adopt this draft decision. In addition, until the
negotiations on an FMCT are concluded and such a treaty enters into force,
Japan urges all the nuclear-weapon States and non-NPT States Parties to declare
a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.
Mr.
Chairman,
In
relation to security assurances, at the time of signing the NPT in 1970, Japan
stated that "nuclear-weapon States must not have recourse to use of
nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
States". As demonstrated by this statement, Japan has basically supported
the idea of negative security assurances (NSAs) from the beginning.
This
year the CD carried out focused discussions on NSAs. What was made clear
through the discussions of the first part of this year was that all the
nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed the provision of negative security assurances
to the level stipulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984. This
should be commended.
Furthermore,
it was also made clear that no nuclear-weapon State is opposed to the idea of
granting negative security assurances through nuclear-weapon-free zone
treaties. Ensuring the effectiveness of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones,
including working towards their entry into force,, is important as a practical
and realistic step for NSAs. In this regard, it has been reported that ASEAN
foreign ministers will convene a meeting in Manila this July to review the
Bangkok Treaty and to draft a protocol which the nuclear-weapon States would be
able to sign on to. We welcome such efforts. We hope that the prompt signing
and ratification of the protocol by all nuclear-weapon States can be realized
through such consultations.
Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.