STATEMENT BY H.E.MR. SUMIO TARUI

AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN

TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva, 8 February 2007

Mr. Coordinator,

Distinguished delegates,

Since this is the first time for my delegation to take the floor during this informal plenary on agenda item two, at the outset let me congratulate you, Ambassador Trezza, on your assumption of the position of Coordinator. We have great confidence in your able guidance and assure you of our full cooperation.

Mr. Coordinator,

For preventing nuclear war, a range of approaches and numerous efforts, such as reducing the operational status of nuclear weapon systems, have been considered to prevent an accidental outbreak. The most obvious approach to preventing a nuclear war, however, is the actual elimination of nuclear weapons and the promotion of nuclear disarmament to that end. Japan has often stated that halting the production of nuclear weapons is required for the achievement of their total elimination, and for that purpose a qualitative and quantitative cap on production is necessary and important. In relation to a qualitative cap, we have already completed the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and it is critical that we push for its early entry into force. In relation to a quantitative cap, through the prompt conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT, it is necessary to prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, as well as to ensure fissile materials for non-nuclear weapon purposes are not diverted or reverted to nuclear-weapon use.

The necessity of immediately commencing negotiations on an FMCT was clearly expressed as one of the three important measures for achieving nuclear disarmament in the adopted “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Negotiations on an FMCT were also included as one of the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Furthermore, not only has there been no disagreement expressed in the CD over the significance of an FMCT to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, but rather there is common recognition of such significance.

Nevertheless, pending the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, in order to heighten momentum towards its establishment, Japan would like to reiterate the importance of declaring a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons by all the nuclear weapon states and non-NPT states parties.

Mr. Coordinator,

During the focused structured debate on an FMCT last May, around 15 countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, dispatched over 20 experts from capitals, and a great number of working papers, including the US draft treaty and mandate, were submitted. Discussions on all aspects of an FMCT, including definition, scope, stocks and verification, also took place, almost fully exhausting the time allocated in the formal and informal meetings. Needless to say, it is still undecided, for example, what fissile materials will be subject to a production ban. Also, discussions on a verification mechanism have yet to converge. Nevertheless, these are issues that can be resolved within the negotiations. What is important to note is that the key concepts for negotiations have already been clarified through our previous debates and proposals. Therefore, it is undisputed that we have reached the stage where treaty negotiations on an FMCT could begin at any time.

Mr. Coordinator,

In this statement, we have re-emphasized the need for agreement to be reached on the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Nonetheless, since actual negotiations have yet to begin Japan will lend its utmost support to you, Mr. Coordinator, in your endeavors. During the informal plenary, Japan aims to enhance the substance of deliberations on an FMCT, through specific comments on the working papers including a draft treaty already circulated, in order to facilitate the early conclusion of negotiations once they begin. The sub-agenda for the first session, presented by the coordinator last week, comprehensively covers all issues relevant to the creation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and we intend to actively contribute to the discussions therein.

Finally, for the purpose of intensifying discussions on the main issues of an FMCT, we believe our working paper (CD/1774) submitted to the CD last year continues to be useful to our deliberations, and we encourage the CD member states to familiarize themselves with the ideas contained within that paper.

Thank you, Mr. Coordinator.