Statement by H.E. Mr. Yoshiki Mine

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan

to the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 6 September 2006

At the outset I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Ambassador Anton Pinter, the head of the Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva, for convening this formal plenary and granting me an opportunity to make a statement.

Mr. President

Conscious of the shared view that the deadlock at the CD must be resolved through substantive discussions, focused structured debates were carried out based on the CD agenda under the P6 initiative this year. The fact that in-depth discussions on each agenda item took place during these focused deliberations was the most significant outcome of the CD in recent years. In this connection, I would like to thank the Six Presidents for their efforts; they have brought new light to the Conference.

However, we should not be content with this achievement, but should carry this year’s momentum through to the next and develop it further. Today, in order to provide a basis for this purpose, I would like to give an overview and assessment of this year’s work on the four major agenda items -- nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances (NSA), a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

Mr. President

Firstly, during the focused debates on nuclear disarmament, the United States and the Russian Federation noted within their statements that they were advancing nuclear disarmament based on the Moscow Treaty. In particular, it should be duly acknowledged and welcomed that both countries based their statements on concrete and detailed figures. It was also encouraging that a few other nuclear weapon States gave similar statements on their own specific measures for nuclear disarmament. Regardless, as already noted by many countries including Japan, the nuclear weapon States are being strongly urged to make further reductions to nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, throughout this year’s focused debates it has been indicated that further deliberations are required within the CD on this agenda item.

However, continuing deliberations and establishing an ad hoc committee as a venue for these deliberations are two separate issues. Specifically, since it is the nuclear weapon States that must carry out actual nuclear disarmament, ultimately it is not possible to establish an ad hoc committee without agreement of all the nuclear weapon States. As a result of careful analysis of the statements by the nuclear weapon States on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament, it is clear that no such consensus has emerged. Naturally, attempts will be made to persuade the nuclear weapon States in future discussions to alter their positions, but until such a change occurs, we must accept, though reluctantly as it may be, the reality that establishing an ad hoc committee is not possible.

Moreover, given that even the issue points are still unclear on nuclear disarmament, priority should be given to the continuation of deliberations rather than establishing an ad hoc committee.

Mr. President

Regarding NSA, a similar situation to nuclear disarmament can be seen. During this year’s focused debates, a regional approach via nuclear weapon free zone treaties and a global approach were discussed. In addition, other important issues were raised, such as the appropriate forum for dealing with and which countries should receive the full benefits of NSAs. Once again it was recognized that there are a diverse range of approaches and ideas, and it was indicated that there are still areas that require further discussions at the CD.

Since it is the nuclear weapon States that provide the NSAs, their positions are crucial when conducting discussions on this matter. In the statements by the nuclear weapons States, none have expressed a negative view about the provision of NSAs via a regional approach. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the establishment of an ad hoc committee on NSA through a global approach commands consensus. Therefore, as for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this matter, it can be drawn that such a current situation surrounding the NSA needs to be taken into consideration.

Mr. President

Under an FMCT, it is obvious that the nuclear weapon States shoulder the central role. Nevertheless, since the states that have tested nuclear weapons as well as non-nuclear weapon States must also assume core obligations not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons, this agenda item concerns all CD member states. Unlike nuclear disarmament and NSA, FMCT is not an issue that the nuclear weapon States should bear sole responsibility for. This is a prominent difference. During the structured debates on FMCT this May, around 15 countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear, dispatched over 20 experts from capitals, and a great number of working papers including the US draft treaty and mandate were submitted. Discussions on all aspects of an FMCT, including definition, scope, stocks and verification, also took place, almost fully exhausting the time allocated in the formal and informal meetings.

In the statements by CD member states, although there exists a range of opinions from the perspective of the whole CD schedule, it is a significant fact that no opposition was expressed from any country including the nuclear weapon States to the establishment itself of an ad hoc committee for negotiating an FMCT in the CD.

Mr. President

Lastly, in the focused debates on PAROS in June, a few countries dispatched experts from capitals and a number of working papers were submitted. However, what became apparent over the course of the focused debates was that, first of all, its relationship with existing space-related institutions such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is ill defined. In particular, it has become evident that such issues as space debris, jamming and cyber attacks can be more appropriately handled by existing related institutions. It has also been pointed out that confidence-building measures can be handled under the existing Outer Space Treaty regime and not the CD.

An important point has also emerged that its central concept for possible negotiations, that is the weaponization of space, is vague and obscure. At first glance a ban on the placement of weapons in outer space seems a fascinating topic. Nonetheless, in all actuality, it is completely nebulous what kind of weapons do exist or could exist, and of those such weapons what do we want to prohibit the placement of, or what should be prohibited.

Mr. President

The CD is not an institution whose aim is to adopt ambiguous political declarations, but rather to negotiate legally-binding treaties. In drafting legal documents, clarifying the central concept that governs those documents is a necessary minimum requirement.

Summing up, since our deliberations on PAROS have not reached maturity due to its ill-defined relationship with existing institutions and the vaguness of its central concept, I must say we are not even at a stage for establishing an ad hoc committee.

This concludes my assessment of this year’s discussions and outcomes at the CD. I hope this will be food for thought for the future work of the CD.

Thank you