(Security Assurances)
Mr. President,
Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, let me, at the outset, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and assure you of our full cooperation.
Mr. President,
Security assurances are one of the two biggest issues that have existed since the beginning of the negotiations on the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. But, just as other issues related to nuclear disarmament have not been fully implemented, security assurances also remain unresolved. There are differing views on how much progress has been made or how much has been realized, since the states have been arguing about it whenever there has been an opportunity, such as in the Conference on Disarmament or the NPT Review Conferences. The difference in these views seems to be typically expressed as the glass being either half empty or half full.
Today, I have no intention of attempting to be the final word in this debate. I would, however, just like to share with you a few points of importance regarding security assurances. First, what needs to be asked is, how important is the pursuit of elevated levels of Negative Security Assurances? In 1995, within the framework of the NPT it was agreed that further steps should be considered on NSA. This meant steps further than UNSC resolution 984 and the declarations by the Nuclear Weapon States(NWSs), which were issued before the Review and Extention Conference. It was also agreed in 1995 that those steps could take the form of an internationally legally-binding instrument. In 2000, it was additionally agreed that legally-binding security assurances would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
In these agreements, negotiators seem to have carefully chosen the right words so that states parties could later pose questions in order to clarify what the international community actually wanted. Now I would like to highlight a few issues on which states parties must be convinced of in order to advance to the next stage.
It is generally assumed there are two different types of security assurances – positive and negative. Are negative security assurances better and stronger than positive? Related to this question I must ask further if a globally legally-binding instrument can be truly effective as opposed to regional ones such as those contained within Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZs), in view of the different security environments of each country.
Mr. President,
In regards to negotiations on Negative Security Assurances, some countries have expressed doubts about whether the CD or NPT are the appropriate venue for negotiations, because we must be explicit about the beneficiaries of such assurances. But there are more fundamental questions that require our attention. Security assurances are to be given to non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), but is the concept of NNWS clear in the context of NSA? Are countries that allegedly possess nuclear weapons eligible for assurances? Similarly, is a country that neither affirms nor denies the possession of nuclear weapons eligible? Is a country that intends to acquire nuclear weapons, if there are any, eligible? Or, as the flip side of the coin, do we then have to grant the status of quasi-nuclear weapon state to countries that have conducted nuclear weapon tests, or claim to possess nuclear weapons? If so, wouldnft this have a devastating effect on the integrity of the NPT? I am uncertain what kind of position should be taken on these questions. These are obviously important but beyond my capacity to answer today and I would like to leave them as they are for the moment.
Mr. President,
We are of the view that the security assurances should be guaranteed not just through official commitments -- positive or negative, legal or political -- but also through raising awareness of the true nature of nuclear weapons. In this connection, awareness of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons has been strongly publicized through the efforts of the ehibakushaf, living witnesses of the catastrophe caused by nuclear weapons, and the International Court of Justicefs 1996 advisory opinion. Both have made irreplaceable contributions to awareness raising, but on the other hand there is an unfortunate tendency for people to forget the agonies of the past. Moreover the ehibakushasf are fast disappearing, with their average age now reaching almost 74. Therefore, it is an urgent task for the international community to pass down their experiences and stories to future generations. We must sustain and improve our efforts to draw the attention of the people and decision makers to the true nature of nuclear weapons.
In this context, I would like to reiterate the importance of disarmament education. Education may sound too narrow to express the broad spectrum of items which are required to promote disarmament education. Not only education in schools but also public lectures and forums, training courses for diplomats, seminars and other endeavors help to raise the awareness of the terrible nature of nuclear weapons.
This year in