Statement by H

Statement by H.E. Yoshiki Mine

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan

To the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 15 June 2006

Mr. President

Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, let me, at the outset, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and assure you of our full cooperation in this structured and focused session on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Mr. President

I would like to state clearly that Japan, like other countries, is concerned with the safety of outer space. We share the view that in recent years the pace of technical innovation together with the upsurge in satellite technology use has been truly astonishing. Consequently, for the international community the smooth maintenance of outer space for peaceful use has become a matter of urgency. However, due to the rapid advancement in the use of satellites, there is the possibility that the efforts of the international community could lag behind the growing number of problems surrounding the use of space. As it has been pointed out by many speakers who have already taken the floor in the thematic discussions on PAROS, tackling this issue with foresight is not only important but essential and we must maintain a healthy environment for satellite operations.

Mr. President

In the past several days fruitful discussions were carried out and I can say that they helped us to deepen our understanding of the related issues. But there is a salient feature which runs through these discussions – that is, the issue of peaceful use and the so-called weaponization or militarization are discussed in a disordered manner.

A number of issues have emerged throughout the discussions in the CD and various UNIDIR seminars on PAROS. The following are some examples:

· Space debris.

· “Rules of the road” for satellite operations (including situations of changing orbits).

· Information sharing on the state of satellite operations (completion of a registration system).

· Cyber attacks on space related data.

· Direct attacks on satellites (using such weapons as ground based missiles, air launched missiles, ground based high energy lasers, nuclear EMP weapons, killer satellites and ASATs).

· Jamming satellite transmissions.

· The misuse of micro-satellites, including the misuse of systems to resist satellite weapons (for example parasitic microsatellites).

Of course, this is not an exhaustive list, but with regard to future discussions, we should arrange these and other items in accordance with their importance, urgency and the current state of international efforts. Since many of these items are already handled under the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the ITU, it is necessary to try and see how far we can deal with these issues within the institutions and frameworks responsible for them.

As to the other types of topics such as the militarization or weaponization of outer space, I would like to draw attention to a few points in this regard. Firstly, we heard a considerable amount on militarization, weaponization or the distinction between these two concepts, but it is unclear what they mean in reality. We are not sure whether such a problem actually exists or not. Some mention was made to “new concept weapons”. But what are they, where are they? Without specific explanations I cannot help but say they are part of “science fiction”.

Secondly, outer space technology is often dual use and the formulation of regulations would be inherently complex. For example the US Global Positioning System (GPS) can guide a warship to its target, but in Tokyo that same system can also guide a taxi driver to its destination. This was indicated in a number of statements. The distinguished representative of the United States gave ample explanation of the dual aspects of satellites the day before yesterday. Reflecting the inherent dual use nature of satellites, it has been indicated that the scope of a possible legal instrument should only deal with weaponization.

Thirdly, in our discussions last week I noted some delegations made reference to the Sea-bed treaty and the Antarctic treaty in the context of PAROS. Nevertheless, in my opinion, unlike these treaties PAROS needs a different type of expertise. These aforementioned treaties did not have to grapple with the specific features of weapon systems. Moreover, within PAROS the study of the extremely technical issues related to satellites is necessary.

Therefore on such concepts as weaponization or militarization, it is crucial to build up our deliberations by arranging and acquiring a clear understanding of the complex and sophisticated technical problems. We should avoid discussions that would seem to prejudge the final outcome based on these abstract debates. Japan is prepared to continue deliberations in the plenary, formal or informal sessions.

Mr. President

I would now like to make a few additional remarks on space debris. In connection to this matter COPUOS established a Scientific and Technical Sub-committee Working Group, which drafted a text on space debris mitigation guidelines. [f1] As part of Japan’s contribution a Japanese expert took part in and played a central role in this Working Group. Japan fully supports these guidelines [f2] and highly regards the people involved in this valuable work. Furthermore, in April this year Japan held the 24^th International Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), which was attended by 97 delegates from 10 outer space related organizations. The discussions that took place at this committee made a vital contribution to the future direction of study on space debris. Still, this is not the limit to Japan’s contribution, we are fully prepared to actively contribute in any future efforts on space debris.

Mr. President

At this stage, we would like to extend our appreciation to the Chinese and Russian delegations for their comprehensive list of specific confidence building measures concerning space activities contained within their working paper (CD/1778). That list also includes many existing bilateral and multilateral measures that are already in place. Japan also participates in exchanges of opinions, mutual visits and prior notification measures amongst other CBM related activities. To give a recent instance, in November last year as a HCOC confidence building measure, a visit by representatives from six HCOC participant nations took place at the JAXA Tanegashima Space Centre. The objective of this visit was to confirm that the launches from this facility were for civil purposes and proved to be a good opportunity to deepen understanding vis-à-vis Japan’s space policy. This is just one example of how CBMs are applied on the ground. Nonetheless, discussions on the utility of CBMs based on the actual state of each measure are still a necessity.

Thank you