STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. YOSHIKI MINE

AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN

TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

(FMCT)

Geneva, 16 May 2006

Mr. President,

At the commencement of the structured focused debate on an FMCT, let me once again, extend my delegation's heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the presidency and assure you of our continued cooperation.

Mr. President.

As it is well known, Japan has attached great importance to an FMCT as the priority at the CD as a measure to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, we welcome with great anticipation this month’s session of structured, focused debate.

With this in mind, I have asked for the floor today to present to the Conference Japan’s Working Paper on an FMCT. Though a great deal of work went into preparing this Working Paper, it is just one part of Japan’s ongoing efforts to contribute to more detailed and precise discussions on an FMCT, and it does not, in any way, prejudge Japan’s position in future negotiations. We have endeavored, as objectively as possible to present ideas that are most appropriate, and although you should all have a copy, I would now like to highlight a number of those ideas.

Structure of Japan’s Working Paper

Mr. President

In this Conference as well as in the international community as a whole, there has been a broad recognition for more than a decade that an FMCT is ripe for negotiation. In fact, in the opinion of our delegation, an FMCT has never been riper than at this present time, bearing in mind the need for further strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and ensuring a safer security environment, and also the potential threats of the diversion of nuclear technology through underground proliferation networks, as well as nuclear weapons or related material falling into the hands of terrorists. In this connection, we have outlined in the first section of our Working Paper the significance and relevance of an FMCT to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The significance and relevance of an FMCT can be best summed up by Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which states, “each of the Parties to the NPT undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” In order to achieve such aims, quality capping by comprehensively banning nuclear testing and quantity capping by banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices are both necessary and important. Negotiations on the CTBT to cap the quality of nuclear weapons have already been completed, and the promotion of its early entry into force is essential. Quantity capping of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, should be achieved through the early commencement and conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT which prohibits production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. So far, four nuclear weapon states have declared moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Nevertheless the international community has to make such a trend universal and irreversible, transforming unilateral political declarations into legal obligations under a treaty.

In addition to such a fundamental significance inherent in an FMCT, under the current international security environment where the possibility of nuclear material being diverted to non-state actors is a major concern, strengthening nuclear security can be added as a contemporary significance for an FMCT

Major issues

Mr. President

Since there are many issues that make up an FMCT, more than could be covered in one Working Paper, we have focused on the four major issues: the scope of core obligations, verification, existing stocks and definition.

Firstly, in the various discussions held up until now, there is a consensus that a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices would be the core obligation of an FMCT. Additionally, it is obvious that fissile material for civil use should not be subject to a production ban under an FMCT.

The scope of core obligations could encompass other issues than the aforementioned. On future production of fissile material we note that broad consensus exists for its inclusion in an FMCT as a minimum. Consequently, after the entry into force of an FMCT, states parties possessing production facilities for nuclear weapon use fissile material would be obligated to close down, decommission or convert those facilities to non-nuclear-weapon use. Because “reversion” of such facilities to nuclear-weapon use would equate to de facto production, such reversion should be subject to a ban.

Since “diversion” of existing and future stocks of fissile material for non-nuclear weapon use to nuclear-weapon purposes would also be substantially the same as production, it should also be subject to a ban.

Transfer and assistance to another state in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes would also constitute production; this should also be within the scope of core obligations.

Secondly, within our working paper we examined the concept of verification within an FMCT. We believe there are four possible ways to consider verification. These are: 1. confirm that the amount of stock of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices has not increased from the date an FMCT enters into force; 2. confirm that the reactors and facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices that are closed down, decommissioned or converted to non-nuclear-weapon-use remain so; 3. confirm that fissile materials that have voluntarily been declared as excess as a result of nuclear disarmament are not reverted back to nuclear weapons purposes; and, 4. confirm that fissile materials for non-nuclear-weapon purposes have not been diverted to nuclear-weapon purposes.

There are many issues that require examination. For example, in regards to category 1, it will be necessary under FMCT verification to declare all past production of fissile materials, but from the perspective of proliferation sensitive information, it has been pointed out that making such declarations mandatory may be unrealistic. Moreover, it has been pointed out that identifying production time and purpose of fissile materials would also be challenging and would require the active input of the states possessing such materials.

However, for example, regarding category 2, after joining an FMCT, fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons in States Parties will inevitably be closed down, decommissioned or converted to non-nuclear-weapon use. Confirmation that those facilities, at least the facilities closed down, decommissioned, or converted to civil use, will never again “operate” as production facilities for nuclear-weapon purposes would be necessary and significant from the perspective of ensuring the core obligation of an FMCT. Moreover, the verification of this category would have the effect of substantially verifying a large part of category 1 and will be extremely important for improving the confidence in an FMCT. Also, with regard to category 3, namely, verification of fissile material voluntarily declared excess for nuclear weapon purposes, discussions are already underway between the US, Russian Federation and the IAEA. Examining the integration of category 3 into an FMCT, with reference to this Initiative, would be significant from the perspective of legally ensuring irreversibility.

The point we would like to make here is that conducting a more detailed examination of each concrete way of verification is important. As we have made it clear within our Working Paper the issue of verification is far from cut and dried, consequently, further discussion is evidently required.

Thirdly, precisely detailing what specific obligations would be envisaged in regards to existing stocks under an FMCT is imperative. Certainly, the transfer of stocks for nuclear weapons to a third country, the diversion to nuclear-weapon purposes of stocks from conventional military use, and the “reversion” back to nuclear-weapon purposes of stocks declared as excess (nuclear-weapon use and conventional military use) should be banned. Nevertheless, as we have noted in our working paper, there are further issues in relation to existing stocks that could be studied, such as transparency enhancing measures and realizing physical protection obligations from the perspective of strengthening nuclear security.

Fourthly, there is consensus that “special fissionable material” under the IAEA Charter should fall under the definition of “fissile material for nuclear weapons”. Inclusion of other material should be studied in detail by experts based on possible discussions in the IAEA.

Mr. President

Finally, the significance of an FMCT as the next logical step for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is more relevant today than ever before. I noted with interest that in your statement before the April break you referred to a passage in Alice in Wonderland. Maybe you should have finished quoting the full exchange between Alice and the Cheshire Cat, because Alice says, “I don’t care where – so long as I get somewhere,” to which the Cheshire Cat replies “Oh, you’re sure to do that, if only you walk long enough.” We hope these discussions on FMCT take us “somewhere” because we have certainly walked long enough.