STATEMENT BY H.E. Mr. YOSHIKI MINE

AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN

TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva, 28^th June 2005

Mr. President,

Negotiations on the FMCT have long been anticipated: mention of the FMCT has been included in the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, as well as in the annual resolution in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, although truly regrettable that agreement was unable to be reached on any substantial document, many countries, regardless of the regional group setting, also called for the commencement of negotiations on the FMCT. The CD’s relevance would be called into question if we were unable to respond to this ardent call from the international community, not to mention the further strain this would place on the NPT regime.

We therefore strongly request the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations in the CD. Of the main issues, FMCT is, in our view, by far the maturest priority for negotiation. I would like to reiterate Japan’s belief that the CD should therefore tackle this item based on its merit, and that FMCT should be de-linked from other issues, in order to agree on the programme of work at the CD and resume its substantial work.

Conclusion of the FMCT will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Capping the production of fissile materials that can be used for nuclear weapons is an essential requirement for nuclear disarmament. The FMCT will also contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation by globally banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of such materials through its verification system, as well as preventing such materials from falling in the hands of terrorists. The FMCT would also offer a good opportunity to the three non-NPT States which possess nuclear weapons to engage in international efforts toward achieving the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. President,

Let me briefly reiterate Japan’s position on one of the outstanding issues in the FMCT mandate, that of verification.

As for the mandate, Japan is flexible as long as negotiations are conducted without preconditions, including on the issue of verification. Japan opposes any mandate that precludes the possibility of the inclusion of verification in the final outcome. In short, issues on verification should be resolved through negotiation, not necessarily before. Needless to say, Japan supported the Shannon mandate and still supports it, although Japan can be flexible with other proposals on FMCT provided that there is a consensus.

Japan considers that an effective verification system is essential for a FMCT. IAEA safeguards measures would provide a good basis for the consideration of a future verification system for the FMCT.

Japan submitted working paper CD/ 1714 dated 19 August 2003 to the CD which covers these issues. The paper intends to structure discussion on the FMCT by categorizing various issues according to (1) scope, (2) technical issues including verification, and (3) organizational and legal issues. Despite certain development on the mandate, as I mentioned, this paper would be a contribution to future negotiation and offers a good understanding of Japan’s basic views on the FMCT.

Thank you.