Statement by Mr. Takeshi
NAKANE
Deputy Director-General,
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department,
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Representative of
At the Subsidiary Body
of Main Committee III
Delivered on
Mr.
Chairman,
Let me take this
opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship, and
assure you of our delegation’s fullest support for the work of this important subsidiary
body.
Withdrawal from the NPT is
extremely serious. The central obligations of the NPT are that non-nuclear
States do not produce or acquire nuclear weapons and that nuclear-weapon States
do not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States. Withdrawal from the NPT
by a State Party literally means that that State is free to leave these
obligations, thus such a State could cause a security concern to neighboring countries,
the region and beyond.
The most serious case is
a State’s withdraws from the Treaty after having developed nuclear weapon capabilities
under false pretenses while being a member to the Treaty and while enjoying its
rights under the Treaty. We must find the best way to deal with this “loophole”
in the Treaty.
I would also like to
point out that withdrawal of any State from the Treaty would significantly
undermine the universality of the NPT and the confidence of the State Parties
in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT.
Therefore, I would like
to stress that, although withdrawal from a treaty is a right of a sovereign
state, we must approach this issue to deter any withdrawal from the NPT.
Mr.
Chairman,
I would like to present
the basic position of
First of all, proposed
measures must not constitute a road map for legitimate withdrawal from the
Treaty. Any measure, whether measures before or after withdrawal, must serve as
an effective deterrence.
Second, the withdrawal
issue needs expeditious response, and measures which require amendment to the
NPT provisions would not be realistic.
From this basic position,
Japan prefers an approach focused on raising the cost of withdrawal rather than
elaborating procedural steps before the withdrawal, although one approach does
not exclude the other and we are ready to consider any effective measures.
Let
me present our proposal.
First of all, the
Conference should reaffirm that a State Party who has withdrawn from the Treaty
remains responsible for any violations it committed while A Party to the Treaty.
This is based on well established international law.
Secondly, it is important
that State Parties urge any supplier country of nuclear material, facilities
and equipment, to make the necessary arrangements so that any nuclear material,
facilities and equipment transferred prior to their withdrawal from NPT has to
be returned or neutralized.
Mr.
Chairman,
First, as for
the proposal on the extraordinary meeting of State Parties in relation to the
notification of withdrawal, we have some reservations. Gathering all States
Parties would take time and entail logistical difficulties. Also, it could
hinder the efforts made through arrangement by small number of countries concerned.
Furthermore, there might be a case where not all the State Parties share the same
view with regard to that specific case of withdrawal and the result of such
Conference would not be able to respond to security concern of the neighboring
countries of the Party intending to withdraw. We recognize benefit of having
such a Conference; Such an extraordinary conference
can show to the world that the NPT regards withdrawal seriously; collective
response could have larger pressure, also forge a sense of inclusiveness.
However, the aim of this exercise must place a priority on resolving the
serious situation that could be caused by a withdrawal of a specific Party.
I noticed that EU proposed differs in
this regard, namely proposing the Depository States consult with interested
parties. Consultation among states concerned is a realistic measure,
however, Depositary States may not always be relevant interested parties.
We do not
categorically deny the possibility of an extraordinary conference by States
Parties or involvement of Depositary states, however, these proposals need to
be modified or reconsidered to satisfy aforementioned requirements.
I would like
to reiterate that the best arrangement is case-specific and requires
flexibility.
Second, concerning the
Security Council’s involvement, the Australia/New Zealand paper proposes
automatic and immediate consideration by the Security Council. However, there
could be cases in which the Security Council would be better saved as a diplomatic
leverage for resolving the issue while initial solutions are sought at other arrangements,
such as regional consultation.
Also, it would be
legally difficult to include automatic consideration by the Security Council
within the NPT framework, because such decisions can only be made by the
Security Council. Therefore, we consider at this point that notification of a withdrawal
to the Security Council is sufficient.
Mr.
Chairman,
It is truly regrettable
that the Conference has lost large part of its time to procedural matters, however, we must make the best use of the time
remaining. I therefore strongly urge all States to make every effort to agree
on effective measures to tackle this important issue.
Thank
you.