Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The serious
challenges
to the NPT regime since
the 2000 NPT Review Conference highlight why, more than ever before, we should
focus on non-proliferation issues.
First of all, the
decision by the DPRK in January 2003 to withdraw from the NPT and its declaration in
February 2005 regarding the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons are sources of deep concern.
The
undeclared nuclear program by
Mr. Chairman,
The international
community has undertaken a
series of countermeasures to resolve these challenges. These include strengthening
the IAEA safeguards
system, in particular the universalization of the
additional protocol, which enables the IAEA to verify undeclared nuclear
material and activities. There
has been a major stride in promoting universalization
of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol during the
last five years. IAEA has been conducting thorough investigation
and verification of Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs.
International cooperation
on
non-proliferation has been significantly
enhanced, e.g. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Efforts are being made to strengthen
export controls
through the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). IAEA's
activities aimed at protecting against nuclear terrorism are also greatly appreciated.
In furtherance of these counter proliferation
measures and to achieve the goal of strengthening the NPT regime, I would like to highlight the major issues before
Main Committee II.
(Nuclear Non-Proliferation)
First and foremost, there
should be no more additional
states permitted to possess nuclear weapons. Any nuclear weapon program in any country
should not be permitted.
In
this regard, all nuclear programs in the DPRK must be completely dismantled under credible international verification. I would like to express our deep concern
regarding the decision by the DPRK in January 2003 to withdraw from the
NPT. It is contrary to the efforts
to universalize the NPT. The statement by the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in February 2005 regarding the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons,
and indefinite suspension of its participation in the Six-Party Talks, is
extremely regrettable. We must also
express serious concern over the recent announcement by the DPRKfs
Foreign Ministry that the DPRK has completed withdrawal of spent fuel rods from
the reactor and that it is continuing to take necessary measures to increase
its nuclear arsenals.
The international community must clearly state
that, under any circumstances, any development, acquisition, possession, test
or transfer of nuclear weapons by the DPRK should not be accepted.
In order to dispel the serious concern of the
international community,
Mr. Chairman,
(The
Strengthened Safeguards System)
Assuring
nuclear non-proliferation through the application of an effective IAEA
safeguards system is a key and essential component of the NPT regime. The universalization
of an impartial and effective safeguards system by the IAEA represents a
significant contribution to the non-proliferation regime.
The
cases of
The modality of the effective safeguards to
ensure non-proliferation evolves and develops as progress in technology and
change in international situation. The NPT envisages this principle in its
preamble paragraph four and five. (NPT parties csupport for effortsc to further
the application, within the framework of the IAEA safeguards system, of the
principle of safeguarding effectively c by use of instrument and other
techniques.)
In
the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was recommended that
the IAEA and its
Following
the recommendations made in the 2000 final document, the importance of the
additional protocol was emphasized in a series of IAEA General Conference
resolutions and Board of
Governors meetings. The General Conference reiterated its request
that all concerned states and other parties that have not yet concluded the
additional protocol together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, should do so as soon as possible. We commend the efforts of the
IAEA Secretariat and the
As
a result of these efforts, there has been welcome and significant progress made
since the 2000 NPT Review
Conference and a number of countries (15) have concluded comprehensive
safeguards agreement. In 2000 the number of additional protocol in force was
only 9. At present, 94 States have signed the
additional protocol and 67
States have ratified it. However,
38 states
have still yet to fulfill their obligation to conclude a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and 14
states with significant nuclear activities still have yet to conclude an
additional protocol. Therefore,
Given
the recent serious challenges to the NPT, it is insufficient to verify only the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material and facilities that have been placed under
safeguards in a State in order to conclude whether all the nuclear activities
in the State are for peaceful purposes. It is vital, therefore, to
provide the IAEA with enhanced
authorities and tools
through the additional protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements in order
to verify the absence of undeclared materials and activities. In our view, those States with significant
nuclear activities have responsibilities to increase transparency, permitting
the Agency the necessary means and authority to verify that nuclear activities
are exclusively for peaceful purpose.
Therefore,
Japan believes
that the strengthened
safeguards system (comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an
additional protocol) should constitute the NPT safeguards standard as required
by paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT from a certain date and we believe
that, with further acceleration of universalization
efforts, the additional protocol should become the
IAEA safeguards standard.
The
establishment and implementation of integrated safeguards plays an important role in
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. Integrated Safeguards also reduce the burdens for the
states concerned through the application of additional protocols. Last June, the IAEA drew
the conclusion that it found no indication of any diversion of nuclear material
or of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
(Effective Export
Control)
Each state should establish
appropriate effective
national rules and regulations with regard to export controls over nuclear-related materials,
equipment and technology.
Such efforts are essential to ensure the implementation of
paragraph 2 of Article III of the Treaty for the purpose of strengthening the
non-proliferation regime.
Export
control is
neither a mechanism for hindering a country's right to the peaceful use of
nuclear technology
nor hampering
its free market activities.
Rather, the activities of export control regimes create confidence
about non-proliferation and thus facilitate the peaceful use of
nuclear energy in a smooth and appropriate manner.
From
this point of view, the role
of multinational export control regimes for nuclear related materials,
equipment and technology, such as the Zangger
Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should be highly appreciated.
These regimes are
informal and voluntary in nature, and also have a limited membership. However, the
published Zangger Committee Understandings
(INFCIRC/209/Rev.2) and the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part1 and
INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part2) are not only useful for participating states, but also
for non-participating states providing
useful basis for the establishment of national export
control systems.
The UNSCR1540 decides that all States shall
establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective export control
systems. We would like to encourage those states that have not yet done so to establish
and implement an appropriate effective export control system, fully taking into
account these guidelines.
When
non-nuclear weapon States procure nuclear related technology and materials which could be also usable for the
development of nuclear weapons, they have a responsibility to increase the
transparency of their activities to permit the IAEA to verify their peaceful
intentions. Only the
Additional Protocol will provide the Agency with the necessary authority and tools
to verify non-diversion to military purpose. Therefore,
in order to strengthen
the NPT regime,
we believe, in addition to
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, concluding the
Additional Protocol should be a
necessary condition
of supply of all items in
the Trigger List of the Zangger Committee
Understandings and of the NSG Part 1 Guidelines to non-nuclear weapons States.
(Nuclear
Security)
Strengthened
nuclear security measures have a particular importance in the fight against
terrorism.
(Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones)
The nuclear weapon capabilities of both
Mr. Chairman,
Lastly,