Working Paper on a Treaty to Ban the
Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive
Devices
Submitted by Japan
パラ１（作業文書（案）オリジナルパラグラフ１）
The Treaty to ban the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (the FMCT) has
been the priority of the international community for the
past decade in multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and in
multilateral arms control fora as a whole. It still remains the priority
despite a sea change in the international security and political landscape and
will be more so due to the growing threats of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to States and non-state actors such as terrorists.
パラ２１（オリジナルパラ２）
The FMCT will represent a significant step
forward in the promotion of nuclear disarmament. A conclusion of the FMCT It will not directly
bring about reductions of nuclear weapons, but nonetheless it will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of
nuclear arsenals. The FMCT will also contribute to the prevention of nuclear
proliferation by banning globally the production of fissile materials for
nuclear weapons and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management
of such material through its verification system.
パラ３（オリジナルパラ３）
The international community has, for
the past decade, expressed its
recognition of the necessity for the FMCT and its ardent desire
for negotiations on at many occasions and in many
forums. Examples include:
パラ４（オリジナルパラ４）
The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/75/L adopted in December 1993 which recommended “the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.”
パラ５（オリジナルパラ５）
The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed on The “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” adopted at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and
Extension Conference, which which called
for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on the
FMCT; Tthis was widely regarded as part of a political
bargaining process between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States,
when the latter abandoned the nuclear option forever as a means for national
security;
パラ６（オリジナルパラ６）
The Final Document adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference which contained the “immediate commencement of negotiations” on the FMCT “with a view to their conclusion within five years” as one of the thirteen practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraph 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”;
パラ７（オリジナルパラ７）
Annual consensus resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly since 2000 urging the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
to agree on a program of work that includes the FMCT
negotiations; and
パラ８（オリジナルパラ８）
The Shannon Report (CD/1299), which included a mandate to negotiate a
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, and was adopted Finally and
above all, the negotiating mandate agreed upon by the CD in March
1995. The CD actually commenced negotiations twice, in
1995 and 1998. For both
times, however, nNegotiations, however, were were too short-lived to reach any
tangible outcome.
パラ９（オリジナルパラ９）
The CD is still unable to start the FMCT negotiations despite all the political commitments
continuously shown by the international community overfor the past decade, including those
above-mentioned. This fact puts into question the relevance and
usefulness of the CD as the only global forum to negotiate multilateral disarmament treaties.
to international peace and security. It
is also a negative factor for the regime of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation TreatyNPT.
パラ１０（オリジナルパラ１０）
The purpose of this paper is primarily to
structure the discussion on the FMCT by
categorizing various issues according to the following items: (1) scope, (2)
technical issues including verification and (3) organizational and legal issues. Individual issues can be
identified through surveying the debate that has been held informally (and
officially toin a very limited extent) on the FMCT.
Structuring and categorization of the issues will facilitate the understanding on them, provide a
useful format for future multilateral debate and thereby contribute
to enhanceing the level of the discussions.
1. Scope
パラ１１（オリジナルパラ１１）
(1) Existing
Stocks
Future negotiators will have to define deal with the scope of the FMCT. in terms of whether the FMCT should deal with the
issue of past production, i.e., existing stocks, beyond the prohibition of
future production. The best way to handle the question of existing
stocks effectively is to start negotiations based on Tthe Shannon report (CD/1299), which
contains a mandate, but or the negotiating mandate contained in it does not
settle this question. The Shannon report describes the existing division of
opinions in an excellently balanced manner and avoids precluding
any delegation from raising the issue for consideration in the negotiations.
パラ１２（オリジナルパラ１２）
The issue of past production is based on the arising from political will to make the FMCT
more directly relevant to nuclear disarmamenteffective
by enhancing transparency, or promoting reduction, of the existing
stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Thus, this question is a very the most controversial part of the
entire debate and requires thorough examinations.
パラ１３（オリジナルパラ１３）
Various suggestions have been made in the
past on the modality to deal with the issue of stocks. Theoretically, there are
several options, ranging from the total exclusion of existing stocks from theits FMCT to the inclusion of legally
binding provisions to eliminate them dealing
with the matter. As a middle way, Canada, for example, proposed in
its working paper (CD/1578) “a separate but parallel process” to deal with this
matter. Also, South Africa proposed in its working paper
(CD/1671) “to ensure irreversibility” of material declared as excess by placing
such material under a special verification arrangement until it becomes of a
less sensitive form. Possible vVoluntary confidence-building measures with respect
to the stocks may be considered to enhance transparency. Another
interesting wayoption would be to make such provisions in the FMCT, whether in the
preamble or in the body, so as to keep open the way a reference to the matter in the preamble of the
FMCT, opening the way for a more substantive
exercise to be conducted in the futureafterwards.
パラ１４（）Most importantly, deliberations on future production should be conducted
without being linked to the issue of existing stocks, because such a linkage
would only complicate the debate. Any tactics to link the two issues will
unnecessarily prolong negotiations and therefore will not be useful, but rather
harmful, to the entire negotiation process.
パラ１５ （オリジナルパラ１４）
Japan is, at this stage, open on this matter to any suggestions that
are conducive to further will have a positive impact on nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation and also to the facilitation of facilitate the
FMCT negotiation process.
(2) Fissile Material for Peaceful Purposes
パラ１６（）In relation to the scope, one view is that fissile
material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be included in the scope
of the prohibition under the FMCT. Japan neither does, nor will, accept such an
argument because the negotiating mandate is crystal clear in defining the
objective of the FMCT as the banning of the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Japan opposes reopening
this question, already settled in the negotiating mandate, because such a move
would only complicate negotiations. Safeguarded peaceful uses of nuclear energy do no
harm to the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
(3)
Examination of Fissile Material and Other Nuclear Materials
オリジナルパラ１６
In parallel with the discussion on the issue of the
scope, substantial technical deliberations need to be
focused on the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in order
to examine fissile materials and other nuclear materials and elaborate an
international verification system for the FMCT. Not only do such deliberations
need to be technically precise but also require difficult political judgements.
Most importantly, therefore, technical
deliberations on the future production should be conducted without being linked with the
issue of existing stocks, because such a linkage would only complicate the
debate. Any tactics to link the two issues will unnecessarily prolong the
negotiations and therefore will not be useful, but rather harmful, to nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament in view of the urgent necessity to advance
negotiations. An argument that technical issues cannot be dealt with until the
scope of the Treaty is determined is not viable.
パラ１７（オリジナルパラ１７）
DefiningExamination of
“fissile
materials” and other nuclear materials is of essential
importance in determining the scope the
elaboration of the provisions of the FMCT., including
its verification system. The term “fissile material” is not used
in the IAEA safeguards system, and therefore it is the right and the task
of negotiators of the FMCT to decide on how to define understand this term.
One thing that is clear at this stage is that
fissile material for peaceful uses is outside the scope of the prohibition no
matter how the term “fissile material” may be understood. The production of
fissile material will be banned only when it serves explosive purposes.
パラ１８（オリジナルパラ１８）
Nonetheless, deliberations must, to a large
extent, benefit
from rely on the experiences of the IAEA in
its safeguards system. Nuclear materials that are subject to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards comprise two mutually exclusive
categories of materials: special fissionable
materials and source materialss. According to the IAEA Statute, “special
fissionable materials” is mainly comprised of are basically plutonium-239,; uranium-233;, and
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233.
オリジナルパラ１９
Another way of categorization of nuclear materials
that is used in the IAEA system is to distinguish direct-use materials from
indirect-use materials. Direct-use materials are those materials that can be
used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive components without transmutation
or further enrichment. They are basically plutonium containing less than 80% of
plutonium-238, highly enriched uranium (HEU: produced by enrichment of
uranium-235 isotope beyond 20%) and uranium-233. Chemical compounds or mixtures
of direct-use materials (e.g. MOX) are also direct-use materials, as is the
plutonium contained in spent fuel.
オリジナルパラ２０
Since the objective of the FMCT is to prohibit the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the concept of “direct-use
material” can reasonably be considered as a basis for the understanding of the term
“fissile material”, while being subject to necessary adjustments in the
specific context of the FMCT. Among direct-use materials, plutonium and HEU are
actually used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Uranium-233 is directly
usable, though
whether it is actually used in nuclear weapons is unknown.
オリジナルパラ２１
How to deal with spent fuel and MOX (Mixed Oxide) depends on
the judgement on the sensitivity of these materials. Basically, irradiated
direct-use material requires more processing time and efforts than unirradiated
direct-use material. Spent fuel needs to go through a separation process, which
results in weapon-usable
plutonium. At the same time it is said that low burn-up spent fuel may be used
directly for nuclear weapons, and in this regard a technical specification on
burn-up should be discussed as a terminating point of FMCT verification. In any
case, what will
be prohibited will not necessarily be the spent fuel per se but the act of
utilizing or diverting it for weapons purposes. Likewise, the peaceful uses of MOX should not be
restricted.
パラ１９（オリジナルパラ２２）
Two transuranic elements, neptunium and
americium, have fissionable capabilities. The Board of Governors of the IAEA
indicated that some controlling measures might have to be applied to these two materials.
It is said that neptunium is suitable for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, while americium is rather difficult to use for
such a purpose due to heat problems and handling difficulties associated with
this material.In
this regard, past discussions in the IAEA fora should be carefully followed.
パラ２０（オリジナルパラ２３）
Tritium is used as a booster for
thermonuclear weapons and is therefore is
essential to increase the yield of warheads. However, tritium is neither a
fissile material nor a nuclear material, and does not explode alone. The FMCT
should focus on fissile material that is indispensable for the manufacture of
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
パラ２１ （オリジナルパラ２４）
Thorium is a fertile material that can be converted to uranium-233. However, thorium itself is not directly usable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
(2) Fissile Material for Peaceful Purposes
オリジナルパラ１５
In relation to the scope, there is a view that
fissile material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be included in
the scope of the prohibition under the FMCT. Japan neither does, nor will,
accept such an argument because the negotiating mandate is crystal clear in
defining the objective of the FMCT as the banning of the production of fissile
material for nuclear explosive purposes. Japan opposes reopening this question,
already settled in the negotiating mandate, because such a move could only
complicate the negotiation. Safeguarded peaceful uses of nuclear energy do no
harm to the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
2 Technical deliberations
(1) ２．Verification
System
（オリジナルパラ２５）
As the Shannon report explicitly mentions, an
international effective verification system needs to be created for the FMCT.
The debate on this issue can also greatly benefit from the experiences of the
IAEA in its safeguards system. The technical aim of the IAEA safeguards system
is defined as the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of
nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear
weapons. The future verification system of the FMCT should generally be based
on the same technical concept (putting aside the applicability of such elements
as “significant quantities” and “timeliness”, which are already given precise
definitions in the IAEA safeguards).
パラ２２ （オリジナルパラ２６）
However, whether it is appropriate for the FMCT to adopt the
same approach as
that for the IAEA safeguards is
debatable. On this question, As for the
verification system of the FMCT, two approaches, comprehensive and
focused, have been proposed and discussed extensively. Although there is no
precise understanding on these ideas and there are some variations onfor each of them,
the comprehensive approach is generally understood to beas a verification system covering all
nuclear fuel cycle facilities and not only fissile material,s but also other nuclear materials. This approach is therefore similar to the IAEA
safeguards. On the other hand, the focused approach concentrates
on enrichment and reprocessing facilities and fissile materials in downstream facilities. This latter approach
may cover R&D laboratories, including hot cells with a capability for the
separation of fissile material.
With regard to the verification system, whether a comprehensive approach should be taken or a focused approach will be an optimum solution is an important but difficult question. In order to find an answer to this question, it will be necessary to consider factors such as security benefits, confidentiality, effectiveness of verification and cost-efficiency.
（オリジナルパラ２７）
The comprehensive approach will clearly be more
expensive than the focused approach. Commercial power reactors in the five
nuclear-weapon States exceed 200. Even if those facilities under the existing
international safeguards systems are to be exempted from the new verification
arrangements, the financial costs to cover all the remaining facilities may
well be very high. The comprehensive approach, however, will have the advantage
of the effectiveness and credibility of verification. The seamless
synergy between the IAEA safeguards system and FMCT verification under the
comprehensive approach will be
straightforward and convincing. A working paper presented by the IAEA paper at a
workshop held in Toronto in 1995 stated “from the technical perspective,
applying verification arrangements to anything less than a State’s entire fuel
cycle could not give the same level of assurance of non-production of fissile
material for nuclear weapon purposes or for use in other nuclear explosive
devices as is provided by the IAEA by implementing comprehensive safeguard
agreements in non-nuclear-weapon States.”
（オリジナルパラ２８）
The focused approach, on the contrary, will have
the advantage of saving financial resources while its
disparity with the IAEA safeguards in the coverage of materials and facilities
will have to be justified. The debate on the latter aspect may, at the same
time, put the IAEA safeguards system in question in terms of its
cost-efficiency. If the focused approach is sufficient for the FMCT, then, can
the current IAEA safeguards system be simplified?
（オリジナルパラ２９）
Apart from the ideological claim for the
non-discrimination between the two systems, the comparative discussion on the
IAEA safeguards system and the focused approach to FMCT verification will be of
utmost importance in order to maintain consistency in the verification regime
in the field of nuclear arms control. In this respect, it can be argued that, in the case
of the IAEA safeguards system under the NPT, the zero tolerance vis-à-vis diversion of fissile
material to weapons purposes has greater
security benefits than such a rigorous attitude may have in the case of the
FMCT supposed to operate under an environment in which nuclear-weapon States
and the States non-party to the NPT
already possess enormous amounts of fissile material for nuclear weapons. A
marginal disparity in the effectiveness between the two systems may be
justifiable from the viewpoint of cost-efficiency if such a difference in the
nature of the security benefits is taken into account. Thorough examinations
will be required to consider a balance
among different factors, such as security benefits of the Treaty, effectiveness
of verification and financial costs involved.
オリジナルパラ３０
Japan, at this stage, does not have any firm view on the question as to
whether a comprehensive or focused approach should be adopted.
パラ２３（オリジナルパラ３１）
The negotiators will also be able to be able to benefit greatly from the
experiences of the IAEA in the consideration of possible key components of a FMCT
verification system. This system will undoubtedly contain, as does the
IAEA system, such components as initial declarations and follow-up reports by
States parties; routine inspections on declared materials and facilities; and
non-routine inspections. The scope of declarations and routine
inspections will be discussed in the light of the examinations of the
examinations of fissile material. The issue of non-routine
inspections is important because such inspections are one means to detect
undeclared activities.
However, this issue
is not simple because the special inspection, the IAEA version of this
type of inspection, has never been carried out. The
challenge inspection of the Chemical Weapons Convention has never been
conducted either.
パラ２４（オリジナルパラ３２）
The IAEA Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) has already introduced
qualitative verification arrangements (expanded
declaration and complementary access) for the detection of undeclared
activities, and such a set of measures should be considered as one of the
pillars of verification, if not as a
substitute for non-routine inspections.
The IAEA also requires States to establish a State
System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). The FMCT will require an equivalent national system
that can be called a State System of Accounting for and Control of Fissile
Material (SSAF). Such a system will be useful not only for States
parties to rely on in order to supply information to the verification
organization but also to apply strict control to sensitive materials against
dangers of finding their way to proliferating countries and terrorists.
パラ２５It is basically considered that IAEA safeguards
measures provided by both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol will provide a good basis for the considerations of a future
verification system for “banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Therefore, additional obligations should not,
in principle, be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon states which adopt both the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement and the Additional Protocol.
パラ２６ （オリジナルパラ３４）
FMCT verification will also deal with
military facilities that have been producing fissile material for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, whether exclusively for such purposes or for
dual purposes with non-proscribed purposes. Such facilities
are not covered by IAEA safeguards. IAEA Safeguards are not applied to such facilities.
The concept of managed access will be relevant in order to ensure that
the issue of confidentiality be duly addressed, particularly with respect to
such military or dual-use facilities.
パラ２７（オリジナルパラ３５）
Reactor fuel for naval vessels, including
military ones, is for non-explosive purposes, and therefore the production of
such fuel should not be prohibited. However, difficulties lie in the
verification of non-diversion of such material to explosive purposes because
confidentiality of the production process of fuel for military vessels is so
high that the normal verification approach may not be applicable.
It is certain that fissile material must be traced
until the material enters a naval fuel fabrication facility and that when the
discharged naval fuel is shipped to a reprocessing plant or a storage facility,
verification measures must resume. A verification procedure to be applied to
the in-between process needs to be worked out.
Other Technical Issues(2) Other
Verification Issues
Another question is whether or not the パラ２８（オリジナルパラ３６）
There is a new issue the IAEA safeguards have
nothing to do with: whether FMCT verification should also be
tasked to
ensure irreversibility with respect to closed-down reprocessing or enrichment
facilities for weapon purposes and to fissile material declared as excess.
3. Organization and Legal
Issues
(1)
Future Organization
パラ２９（オリジナルパラ３７）
The FMCT requires a body to implement
verification. There is an advantage to using existing Obviously the IAEA is equipped with great expertise
and knowledge of the IAEA, withand its
robust infrastructure, including administration and equipment of the IAEA, which will
be required or usable for FMCT verification. Best utilization of
the already existing expertise and infrastructure will save administrative
costs and reduce financial burdens on States parties. However,
FMCT verification is different from IAEA safeguards, and therefore the structure of the IAEA is
not wholly applicable to the FMCT.In any circumstances, the relationship between the
implementing organization for the FMCT and the IAEA should be clearly defined.
オリジナルパラ３８
An interesting aspect of the issue of organization
is that the organization for FMCT verification can be considered as having the potential to become the
organization to verify nuclear disarmament and ultimately underpin the
nuclear-weapons-free world.
The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference specifically enumerates
“the further development of the verification capabilities that will be required
to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the
achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world” as one of the
thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament.
T(2) The
Entry-Into-Force Clause
パラ３０（オリジナルパラ３９）
The entry-into-force clause is a sensitive issue. Lessons can be learned from the history of the CTBT that has a very high requirement for entry-into-force. At the same time, ratifications by the recognized five nuclear weapon States and those States non-party to the NPT are essential for the operation of the FMCT.
(3)
Other Provisions
パラ３１（オリジナルパラ４０）
The FMCT should also have provisions, such as (a) amendment, (b) withdrawal, (c) review process, (d) depositary, (e) accession and (f) languages, as do other multilateral arms control conventions and treaties. Depending upon the prospective for an early entry into force of the FMCT, provisions regarding arrangements before the Treaty enters into force, such as hosting facilitating entry-into-force conferences may also be included in the Treaty provisions. Financial arrangements should also be discussed.
(4). Conclusion
パラ３２（オリジナルパラ４１）
(1) Given the diversity and complexity of the issues of the FMCT, negotiations require extensive technical expertise as well as difficult political judgements. It is an urgent priority to resolve the stalemate in the CD and to commence FMCT negotiations with a view to their conclusion within five years.
パラ３３（オリジナルパラ４２）
(2) The structuring of the debate on the FMCT can be categorized into three items, namely scope, technical deliberations including verification issues and organizational and legal issues. And, for the sake of future negotiation, these can be factorized and further recomposed to: (a) group for legal and political issues; and (b) group for technical issues.
by categorizing
relevant issues into three groups,
namely scope, technical
deliberations including verification issues, and organization and legal issues, will facilitate
understanding and discussion of the issue.
オリジナルパラ４３
(3) The issue of existing stocks is an unresolved one in the
negotiating mandate. This controversial issue will require thorough
examination.
パラ３４（オリジナルパラ４４）
(34) The Shannon mandate is clear in
seeking a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and in precluding fissile material
for peaceful purposes from the scope of the prohibition. This question should
not be reopened.
パラ３５（オリジナルパラ４５）
(45) Negotiations should involve substantial
technical deliberations focused on future
production. Through such deliberations, fissile
materials and other
nuclear materials will be examined and a verification system will be elaborated.
Any tactics to link the banning of future production with the issue of existing
stocks will unnecessarily prolong negotiations and is harmful to nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament. An argument that technical issues cannot be
dealt with until the scope of the Treaty is determined is not viable.
パラ３６（オリジナルパラ４６）
(56) With regard to the verification
system, whether a comprehensive approach , similar to the IAEA safeguards, should be
taken or a focused approach will be an optimum solution is an important but
difficult question. In order to find an answer to this question, it will be
necessary to consider the FMCT
verification system comparatively with the IAEA safeguards, taking into
account different factors such as security benefits, confidentiality,
effectiveness of verification and cost-efficiency.
(6) It is basically considered that IAEA safeguards
measures provided by both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional
Protocol will provide a good basis for the considerations of a future
verification system for “banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Therefore, additional obligations should not,
in principle, be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon states which adopt both the Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.
パラ３７（オリジナルパラ４７）
(7) Given the complexity of the technical deliberations, the idea to establish a group of experts, similar to the one established for technical work on the verification of the CTBT, may merit serious consideration in order to prepare a common knowledge ground for future negotiations.
パラ３８（オリジナルパラ４８）
(8) The issue of
organization for verification is how to make use of expertise and
infrastructure of the IAEA while taking into account the difference of the FMCT
to the IAEA
safeguards. The organization In order to facilitate negotiations on the FMCT
verification system, it would be beneficial to make full use of past experience, expertise, and
infrastructure of the IAEA to an extent comparable with the scope and
aim of the FMCT. The Organizational matters should also be discussed in terms of
theits potentiality for the FMCT
verification system to becominge the future organization to verify nuclear
disarmament and ultimately underpin the nuclear-weapon-free world.
（了）