STATEMENT BY H.E. DR. KUNIKO INOGUCHI

AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN

TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva, 15^th May 2003

Mme. President,

Distinguished delegates,

Allow me, Mme. President, to assure you once again the full support of my delegation for your steadfast efforts to advance the work of the Conference towards the fulfillment of its task.

I have asked for the floor to inform the Conference of the discussions held at the workshop entitled “Promoting Verification in Multilateral Arms Control Treaties - Future verification regime, FMCT in particular” on 28 March co-organized by Japan, Australia and the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research. Many delegations and knowledgeable persons from civil society attended the workshop and participated in the discussions. The co-organizers are especially grateful to those panellists, who came over to Geneva, for their valuable contributions.

Mme. President,

Now please allow me to present a rather detailed account of elements discussed at the Workshop.

The workshop focused on the issue of verification, the key to maintaining and strengthening the credibility of multilateral arms control regimes. In our view, verification deserves special attention, particularly at this juncture, where concern is growing over clandestine activities to develop proscribed weapons of mass destruction. The most critical requirement of verification is, therefore, how effectively it can detect an undeclared activity. However, there are always risks that verification may fail to meet this requirement due to the difficulty of finding clues in submitted declarations and information. In addition, ineffective verification also contributes to the cover-up of clandestine activities. Verification must be adequately effective so that credibility of arms control regimes can be maintained. Ultimately, effective verification will help diplomacy to succeed before choices become limited to acceptance of the inability to solve a problem or military options.

Effectiveness and adequacy of verification is, however, not unconditional. There are quite a few constraints. All verification systems in existence, dealing with weapons of mass destruction, involve a substantial need for financial resources. Cost-efficiency is a guiding principle in arms control as much as in other fields.

Another constraint is related to intrusiveness, not only in terms of a State’s legitimate interest in protecting sensitive military information, but also in terms of proliferation risks that intrusive inspections entail. Those interested in acquiring WMD may get access to priceless information and expertise from such inspections.

All these aspects are interrelated in the overall issue of verification, and it is a profoundly important task to arrive at an optimum solution to balance these factors.

The Workshop was composed of two sessions. In the first session, we discussed possible generic lessons that could be learned from existing verification systems. My special thanks go to those panellists from the IAEA, the OPCW, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO and VERTIC, a non-governmental organization. Their contributions enabled us to discuss different verification regimes in a comparative manner. I believe that it was a unique opportunity, not only for its intellectual interest but also in its contribution towards the debate on new systems, such as FMCT verification. I would now like to share several important points outlined in the discussion.

Firstly, while perfect assurance of compliance may not be given by verification, verification must be effective enough to detect any diversion activity or, at least, suspicious hints of such an activity, in a timely fashion before the problem becomes too serious.

Secondly, cost-efficiency is clearly an important factor, as I have already mentioned. However, it is also true that financial constraints should not override the essential purpose of verification.

Thirdly, the IAEA has a robust infrastructure for verification in the field of nuclear weapons, including equipment and personnel, and therefore the future FMCT verification system should make maximum use of the existing IAEA infrastructure.

Fourthly, while non-routine inspection has never been used, such inspection is still vital for any verification system, particularly in view of its deterrent effect against clandestine activities.

Finally, the Group of Scientific Experts made significant contributions to the seismological verification of the CTBT. It is, indeed, a good example as a modality to advance technical discussions before full-fledged negotiations start. However, whether or not this example is applicable to the FMCT requires careful consideration to determine appropriate issues for such technical discussions.

The second session focused on verification of the FMCT. The co-organizers circulated a list of specific questions in order to structure the debate. I hope that this list of questions will also facilitate an understanding by all interested parties of the overall picture of the debate on FMCT verification. The list includes the following questions:

-- What should be declared and monitored on a routine basis;

-- What techniques would be useful in order to improve the detectability for

non-declared facilities and activities for FMCT, the IAEA-INFCIRC/153

type inspection or random, short-notice type inspection;

-- How sensitive information can be protected and if “managed access” is

appropriate;

-- How the IAEA can be utilized for FMCT verification, etc.

The most fundamental purpose of FMCT verification is to detect any undeclared enrichment or reprocessing activities, which consequently brings us to the question of what approach to adopt in order to meet this requirement. The scope of declaration and routine inspection is, among others, of utmost importance. In this respect, two well-known approaches were discussed: the focused approach and the extended approach. The first approach focuses on enrichment and reprocessing facilities, on highly enriched uranium and plutonium (and U-233) in downstream facilities and on some other types of places, including hot cells. The second approach covers, above and beyond the first approach, low enriched uranium, spent fuel, and so on, that are considered to be feed materials for the production of HEU and plutonium.

This question should be examined in terms of a balance between adequacy and cost-effectiveness. The first approach seems to be less costly than the second approach, but just how expensive the extended approach would be needs to be clarified. Also, there are questions concerning ability to detect undeclared activity, for example, how significantly more effective the extended approach will be if spent fuel is included in the scope of routine inspection. In order to advance the debate further, more precise analyses are required on these questions.

The modality of inspections, including intrusiveness of inspections, is also an important issue in the context of FMCT verification. This issue is related to the protection of sensitive information, the so-called notion of confidentiality. This technical but difficult issue was not extensively discussed at the workshop, however a view was expressed that the idea of managed access that is being adopted under the CWC can be applied under the FMCT. There will be technological as well as financial challenges to overcome the differences.

In this connection there was a useful presentation by one of the panellists on scientific expertise related to noble gases. I believe that environmental sampling is clearly one of the useful verification techniques, for the FMCT.

The issue of verification organization is also complex because it involves questions such as how to use the existing institution of the IAEA. One view expressed was that no stand-alone organization apart from the IAEA would be necessary, while another view maintained that there was a need for a different organization.

The flexibility of the Treaty to adapt itself to technological development in the future without too much difficulty is not a forefront issue, but should always be kept in mind.

Other specific questions, such as how to deal with special cases, including naval reactors, etc., were also raised.

Finally, discussions revealed an uneasy possibility that the most contentious issue, i.e., whether fissile material stocks should be included in the Treaty, could drive the whole negotiations to a stalemate. I believe that such a stalemate is not in the interest of any country, especially after all member States of the Conference have agreed on the commencement of negotiations.

Before concluding, I would like to show my appreciation to both Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director of UNIDIR, and Mr. Hiroyoshi Kurihara, Senior Executive Director of the Nuclear Material Control Center of Japan, for having done excellent jobs as moderators. I would also like to express my special thanks to the CD Secretariat for having assisted us in all the logistical aspects. Finally, I would like to thank my colleague, Ambassador Mike Smith of Australia, and his delegation, for having extended essential support to my delegation.

Thank you.