Statement by H.E. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan

to the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 20^th February 2003

Mr. President,

Distinguished delegates,

At the outset, allow me to express my warmest congratulations, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. As the Conference is facing an over-six-year stalemate, your task will be challenging. I would like to assure you the full support of my delegation in your efforts to enable us to take a step forward in the resolution of the current problem. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India, for having enabled the Conference to commence its annual session smoothly and engage in very meaningful discussions at this difficult juncture.

My special appreciation also goes to Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Enrique Roman-Morey, Deputy Secretary-General, and all the other capable members of the Secretariat for the professional support and assistance they are providing.

Mr. President,

To tackle this imminent problem, the G8 Summit in Kananaskis agreed on the “Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction”. This initiative is a robust cooperative program to support specific projects. Those projects include the disposition of weapon-grade plutonium, the dismantlement of nuclear submarines, the ensuring of the secure management and storage of sensitive material, etc. G8 countries are committed to raising up to $20 billion over the next ten years for the implementation of this initiative.

The two largest nuclear-weapon States, the Russian Federation and the United States, announced in June 2000 that each State would dispose of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium, no longer required for their defence purposes. This step is considered to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament by both States. It is also significant in terms of nuclear non-proliferation because the disposition of weapon-grade plutonium will be subject to monitoring and inspections. I hope that both States will conclude agreements as early as possible with the IAEA to allow speedy implementation of verification measures.

France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are all observing the moratorium on their production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Japan strongly hopes that these four countries will continue along this course, and that the remaining nuclear-weapon State and nuclear weapons capable States which have not yet declared such a moratorium will follow suit as early as possible.

Mr. President,

The legitimacy in calling for the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations derives from various multilateral documents.

Firstly, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”, which called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT. This was part of a political bargaining process between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, when the latter abandoned the nuclear option forever as a means for national security. The major reason for the long impasse of the CD is considered to be a result of different views among nuclear-weapon States, however it is essential to reconfirm that the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT was the commitment made by the nuclear-weapon States vis-a-vis the non-nuclear-weapon States at this very important juncture.

Second, the 2000 NPT Review Conference adopted its Final Document, urging the CD to agree on a program of work, that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. This Document also called for the conclusion of negotiations within five years.

Third, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted an annual consensus resolution on FMCT since 2000.

Finally, and above all, the CD agreed on the negotiating mandate on an FMCT and commenced negotiations in March 1995. The CD also commenced negotiations in 1998. Both times, however, negotiations were too short-lived to reach any tangible result.

The international community cannot afford to waste another year as weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, continue to spread to States and terrorists. FMCT is also important as a multilateral nuclear disarmament step that will be mutually complementary with the significant unilateral and bilateral steps that have been taken over the past years. The international community’s tolerance towards the unproductive CD is growing short. It is also feared that the long-standing inactivity of the CD may undermine negotiating capability in Geneva. The CD must prove its viability as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body by commencing immediately the most relevant instrument to international security, the FMCT.

Pending the agreement on a program of work, and as a country placing the highest priority on FMCT, Japan is interested in working on two tracks. One is to keep the momentum and maintain technical expertise by encouraging education and public awareness on this issue outside the CD. With this view Japan will co-organize, with Australia and UNIDIR, a workshop on “Promoting Verification in Multilateral Arms Control Treaties”, which includes a panel discussion focused on FMCT, on 28 March. This is the second time for our two governments to co-organize such a seminar in Geneva.

The other is to activate substantive discussions on FMCT in CD plenary meetings. Certainly, these discussions will not constitute negotiations, however they will prepare delegations to begin negotiations rapidly once a program of work is agreed upon.

Mr. President,

Now, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference to some important issues related to FMCT that must be dealt with in negotiations. Over the past several years, a variety of seminars and workshops on FMCT have been organized, and we have learned, through these informal meetings, a possible range of basic issues, some of which enjoy a general convergence of views, others of which do not.

First of all, negotiations will inevitably have to deal with the issue of the conceptual framework of the FMCT ? its scope. It is clear that the basic objective of FMCT is to ban the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. However, there is one aspect that needs to be considered to define the scope of the Treaty: “existing stocks”.

Theoretically, there are options that stocks will be excluded from/included in the FMCT in several ways, or taken up under another agreement, or agreements, negotiated sequentially or in parallel with the FMCT. South Africa presented its empirical view (CD/1671) that, with respect to the past production of weapons materials, it is not believed to be feasible to verify the completeness of its declaration, and this opinion deserves to be heeded. In past seminars and workshops, suggestions have been made on how to relate the FMCT to the issue of stocks. One of them is to deal with the stock issue in the preamble of the FMCT, to open the way for future negotiations. It may also be worthwhile discussing stock issues as a voluntary confidence building measure.

Some argue that fissile material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be included in the scope of FMCT negotiations. Japan cannot accept such an argument because it is crystal clear in the negotiating mandate that the aim of the negotiations will be “a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons”. Safeguarded peaceful uses do no harm to the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. More importantly, FMCT negotiations would not start if one reopens the questions already settled in the mandate.

Apart from the issue of “existing stock”, the basic objective of the FMCT is to ban the future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Substantial technical deliberations will be required to achieve this objective without affecting the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Through such deliberations, we need to define the scope of materials to be placed under monitoring, as well as elaborating an international verification system to ensure sufficient credibility of the Treaty.

1. Materials to Be Monitored

There is a general consensus on the notion that plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) can be directly used for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. In the case of HEU, the situation is rather straightforward. The U-235 isotope of uranium enriched beyond 20 percent at an enrichment facility can be used directly for making nuclear weapons, as adopted in the IAEA safeguards. Therefore, enrichment facilities, including those for HEU, if any, should be placed under monitoring so that the materials may not be used for weapons purpose.

In the case of plutonium, there are generally two different views. One is the understanding that once plutonium is produced by irradiation in the reactor core, such plutonium needs to be subject to monitoring. The other view is that plutonium must be monitored only when it is separated from irradiated reactor fuel at a reprocessing facility. The latter view is mainly based on the assumption that plutonium contained in irradiated fuel cannot be used directly for the production of nuclear weapons -- it must undergo the separation process to become material directly-usable for weapons.

In addition to plutonium and HEU, sensitive materials, such as alternative nuclear material (ANM) and thorium, may also need to be discussed. In addition, other activities, such as the recovery of fissile material from waste, separation of other capable materials, etc., also deserve serious attention in the negotiations.

2. Verification

Japan believes that the FMCT verification regime should be composed of three elements: the declaration of fissile materials and facilities by member States, the verification of declared material, and the verification of undeclared material and activities. In order to establish a framework for deliberations, it is useful to draw generic parameters from the arms control verification regimes already in existence. In our view, such parameters are as follows:

1. how to ensure correctness and completeness of the initial declaration;
2. how to guarantee sufficient assurance from routine inspections;
3. how to detect undeclared activities and ensure effectiveness of inspections;
4. how to protect sensitive (confidential) information in the framework of verification;
5. how to ensure cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency; and
6. how to create a verification system that can respond flexibly to technological progress.

An optimum of these interrelated parameters must be found to elaborate an FMCT verification mechanism.

The focused approach may be reasonable in terms of efficiency, but will have to be carefully examined in terms of sufficiency. This would entail different approaches toward fissile material in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The only point I would like to make at this stage is that the non-nuclear-weapon States, which have accepted both the IAEA full-scope safeguards and the additional protocol, are considered to meet FMCT verification requirements.

Naval reactor fuel has a non-explosive, military purpose and therefore should not be banned by the FMCT. Many naval reactors, however, are designed to use HEU fuel which is relatively simple to divert to nuclear weapon use. This issue also requires careful technical examination.

It is essential that the FMCT include a verification organization. The IAEA will certainly be able to play a significant role in this regard, provided that necessary financial resources are offered to the Agency. Its re-organization, however, is as much a political issue as a financial one.

Finally, legal issues, such as the entry-into-force clause, will also need to be addressed.

Mr. President,

International security is multi-faceted, and political interests and priorities are diverse. While Japan places the highest priority on FMCT negotiations, it is willing to accept an appropriate comprehensive program of work, in which exercises on other issues will be conducted in parallel with FMCT negotiations.

At the same time, no unique argument should jeopardize a meaningful, multilateral step forward that is paramount to achieving global security. No tactical linkage is viable unless it represents a substantial part of the differing security interests of the international community.

Thank you.