



**Statement by Ambassador ICHIKAWA Tomiko,  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament**

**Second Session of the Preparatory Committee  
for the 2026 NPT Review Conference  
- Cluster 3 Specific issue -  
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Mr. Chair,

I would like to start by emphasizing the importance of continuing discussions on strengthening the review process, building upon the recommendations of the Chair of the working group on further strengthening the review process held last year, so as to lay the groundwork for concrete decisions to be made at the next Review Conference. In this context, my delegation highly appreciates the leadership of the Chair in emphasizing this issue within the indicative timetable of this Session of the Preparatory Committee.

Mr. Chair,

In this context, Japan attaches great importance to transparency and accountability. In advancing discussions on how to improve transparency and accountability in the NPT review process, we would like to propose the following two measures, which are contained in the working paper on transparency and accountability by the NPDI, of which Japan is a member.

The first measure concerns the content of national reports. The national reports of the nuclear-weapon States vary in their structure and level of information. Therefore, it is imperative for the nuclear-weapon States to report using a standard template that builds on the disarmament elements of the 2013 common reporting framework, including comparable and numerical information.

In adopting such a form, we hope that the "national reporting templates" proposed by the NPDI will be used as a foundation, and that dialogue and consultation will take place between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on the contents of the "standard reporting form".

The second measure relates to the reporting process. We call on the nuclear-weapon States to present national reports twice in every review cycle, ideally to the Second PrepCom and the Review Conference. In addition, the

Second PrepCom should allocate time under cluster 1 and the Review Conference should allocate time in Main Committee I respectively, to hold open and focused discussions on the national reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States on the implementation of Article VI and the relevant commitments undertaken in final outcomes from Review Conferences.

In this regard, it should be noted that while non-nuclear-weapon States demonstrate transparency in the implementation of their non-proliferation obligations through reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based on the IAEA safeguards, there is no specific transparency mechanism for the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the degree of implementation of their obligations. Therefore, in considering national reports, we believe that the focus should be on those submitted by the nuclear-weapon States. In this context, we commend the efforts of some nuclear-weapon States in enhancing their transparency and hope that all nuclear-weapon States will follow their examples.

Mr. Chair,

We would like to promote discussion among States Parties, ensuring continuity of ongoing discussions, in order to formally adopt measures to strengthen the review process, including the above measures, at the next Review Conference.

Pending a formal decision, we would like to call upon States Parties to engage in an interactive discussion on national reports of the nuclear-weapon States on a voluntary basis at the third PrepCom next year.

Mr. Chair,

Finally, allow me to address the issue of withdrawal. Article X of the NPT provides States Parties the right to withdraw from the Treaty. However, if a State Party withdraws from the Treaty after acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear capabilities when it is under an obligation not to do so, it would have an enormous impact on the credibility and integrity of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. Japan emphasizes that notice of withdrawal should not and cannot acquit any State Party of any illicit acquisition of its nuclear capability.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

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